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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to examine the assignment of workers to layers and firms.
In particular, I use an administrative dataset of French workers to study the organization of
firms. First, I test whether higher ability workers are employed in the higher layers of firms.
Second, I test whether there is positive assortative matching between workers in the different
layers of firms. Third, I test whether higher ability workers allow their managers to increase
their span of control and employ larger teams. To do this, I first classify employees as residing
in different organizational layers such as production and administrative workers, supervisors,
senior managers, and owners and CEOs, using occupational codes. From a panel wage re-
gression I then obtain estimates of workers’ ability as in Abowd et al. (1999). I then study how
workers sort into layers and across layers with other workers. I emphasize three results. First,
higher ability workers are employed in the higher layers of firms. Second, I find evidence of
positive assortative matching between workers in the different layers of firms. Third, I find
different mechanisms are behind the sorting pattern observed in the data. I find evidence that
higher ability workers limit their managers’ span of control, and I also find weak evidence
that higher ability workers allow their managers to increase their span of control and employ
larger teams.
KEYWORDS: positive assortative matching, firm organization, matched employer-employee
data, high-dimensional fixed effects.
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1 Introduction
Ever since Coase (1937) economists have known that one of the most important problems a firm
faces is how to organize inputs efficiently. However, classical economic models often abstract
from firms’ organizational decisions. A firm is like a black box, whereby inputs are directly
mapped into a final good. However, an understanding of how firms organize is essential, be-
cause firms determine the allocation of productive resources in the economy.1 One important
organizational decision of firms is what types and how many workers they should hire, as well
as what tasks should be assigned to which workers (Caliendo et al. (2014)).
Despite much theoretical interest, very little is known empirically about how workers sort
together in firms.2 Several researchers have investigated whether good workers are employed
in productive firms. While most empirical studies are concerned with how workers match with
firms, far fewer studies have examined the different tasks workers perform, and whether better
workers are employed with better workers in the other positions of a firm.
This paper fills the gap by examining how workers sort together in firms. My empirical
strategy relies on the idea that firms can be thought of as hierarchical teams, composed of layers
that perform different tasks. The lowest layer of a firm, for example, contains workers who focus
on production, while higher layers contain individuals that perform managerial tasks. With this
in mind, I examine how workers sort into teams and layers within each team. More precisely,
within a team I first test whether higher ability workers are employed in higher layers. Second,
across teams, I test whether there is positive assortative matching, in which the ability of an
individual in one layer is positively correlated with the ability of a worker in another layer.
Third, I investigate whether this sorting pattern is caused by higher ability workers allowing
their managers to increase their span of control and employ larger teams, as suggested by Antras
et al. (2006).
I use an administrative dataset of French workers, the Déclarations Annuelles des Données
Sociales (DADS) to test these predictions. I begin by classifying employees as residing in the
different organizational layers of firms. With my dataset, I observe four distinct layers, produc-
tion and administrative workers, supervisors, senior managers, and owners and CEOs, by using
occupational codes. The concept of a layer that I use is from the management hierarchy theory of
the firm that was introduced by Garicano (2000) and used empirically by Caliendo et al. (2014). In
theory a layer corresponds to a set employees who earn similar wages, are of similar ability and
perform tasks at a similar level of authority (Caliendo et al. (2014)). Since firms are hierarchical
teams, layers have the added property that, within a firm, higher layers contain fewer workers
1As noted by Rosen (1982): ’The firm cannot be analyzed in isolation from other production units in the economy.
Rather, each person must be placed in his proper niche, and the marriage of personnel to positions and to firms must
be addressed directly.’
2For example, several studies have used models of firm organization to investigate earnings inequality (Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)), offshoring (Antras et al. (2006),Antras et al. (2008)) and knowledge diffusion (Dasgupta
(2012)).
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who are of greater ability.
For every firm in the dataset, I calculate the total number of layers in the firm, and the size
of each layer, in terms of labor hours worked. With my dataset I can observe four different types
of organizations, one-layer firms, two-layer firms, three-layer firms, and four-layer firms. I show
that this classification of employees into layers is meaningful and consistent with the concept of
a layer discussed above.
Then for the years 1993 to 2004, I use the panel dimension of my dataset to obtain estimates
of workers’ ability. I estimate a Mincerian wage regression with individual fixed effects, as in
Abowd et al. (1999). I use the individual fixed effects from my regression as my measure of
worker ability.
Using these measures of the size and number of layers of firms, along with measures of
worker ability in these layers, I test my main predictions. First, I conclude that higher ability
workers are employed in the higher layers of firms. For example for four-layer firms, I find that
an individual with a one hundred percent increase in his ability will on average reside 0.511
layers higher. Second, I find evidence of positive assortative matching between workers in the
different layers of firms. For example, in four-layer firms, a one hundred percent increase in the
average ability of workers in layer one is associated with a 0.320 increase in the average ability
of workers in layer two. Third, I find evidence that higher ability workers limit their managers’
span of control. For example, in three-layer firms a one unit increase in the average ability of
workers in layer two is associated with a 27.1 percent decrease in their managers’ span of control.
Finally, I find only weak evidence that higher ability workers allow their managers to increase
their span of control and supervise larger teams. For example, in four-layer firms, a one unit
increase in the average ability of workers in layer three is associated with a 33.4 percent increase
in their managers’ span of control.
Together the last two results imply not all firms are organizing their production in a similar
manner and that different mechanisms are behind the sorting observed in the data. As long as
there is positive assortative matching between workers in the different layers of firms, it is in-
compatible for higher ability managers to supervise less workers and for higher ability workers
to be employed in larger teams. To examine this further I group industries along two differ-
ent dimensions and re-test my main predictions. I first use the OECD (2003) classification of
technological intensity to organize industries by their degree of technological intensity into four
categories, low, medium-low, medium-high and high, and second, I use the Rauch (1999) classi-
fication of goods and group industries by their degree of product differentiation. In both cases,
within groups, I continue to find evidence that high ability workers occupy the upper layers of
firms and of positive assortative matching between workers in the different layers of firms. In
addition, in medium-low technology industries I find weak evidence that higher ability workers
allow managers to supervise larger teams, while in high technology industries I find evidence
that higher ability workers limit their managers’ span of control. For example in three-layer
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firms, in medium-low technology firms a unit a one unit increase in the average ability of work-
ers in layer two is associated with a 25.5 percent increase in the span of control of workers in
layer three, while in high technology firms it is associated with a 49.6 percent decrease.
Grouping industries by their degree of product differentiation, I find a similar pattern in the
data. In industries with a low degree of product differentiation I find weak evidence that higher
ability workers allow their managers’ to increase their span of control, while in industries with
a high degree of product differentiation I find that higher ability workers restrict the number
of agents their managers’ can supervise. These results suggest that the different mechanisms
behind the sorting pattern observed in the data depend on firms’ technological intensity and the
goods they produce.
In the last part of the paper, I address robustness of my results by assessing several potential
threats to my empirical strategy. First, one concern with the empirical analysis is that the worker
fixed effects are inconsistent. Because the worker fixed effects are incidental parameters from a
wage regression, they can only be measured consistently as the number of years an individual
is observed in the panel grows large. To resolve this issue, I conduct my analysis on a restricted
sample of worker fixed effects for workers that I observe for at least 10 periods. Second, as
discussed in Andrews et al. (2008) my measures of workers’ ability may be misestimated and
any positive correlation between the individual fixed effects is the result of a positive correlation
between the estimated error of the individual fixed effects. These threats are important when
examining whether higher ability agents occupy the upper layers of firms, and whether there is
a positive correlation between workers’ ability in the different layers of firms. To address this
issue, I conduct my empirical analysis outside of the sample, for the year 2009, and only on the
set of workers who have moved to a firm that they have never been employed in before. Taking
both potential threats into account, I continue to find that higher ability workers are employed
in the higher layers of firms, and that the ability of individuals in one layer of a firm is positively
correlated with the ability of workers in another layer.
This paper is related to the broad literature on the theory of the firm allowing for management
hierarchies. With the aim of explaining the distributions of firm size and earnings in the economy,
a long-standing literature has examined how productive factors are allocated to managers with
different abilities (for example Lucas (1977) and Rosen (1982)). To motivate my empirical strategy,
I use a model by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) in which agents with different cognitive
abilities sort into occupations, layers and teams. Regardless of the distribution of knowledge in
the economy, the equilibrium displays skill stratification, in the sense that agents with similar
levels of cognitive ability sort into the same occupations and layers across firms. Agents with
the least amount of knowledge become production workers, while agents with high levels of
ability sort into managerial layers which correspond to higher layers of firms. The equilibrium
also displays positive assortative matching, in the sense that higher ability managers organize
into firms with higher ability subordinates. The mechanism behind this result is the following:
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in a given layer, agents of greater ability can solve a greater proportion of problems, and thus
render their subordinates more productive. In turn, because they can solve a greater proportion
of problems alone, higher ability subordinates require less of their superiors’ time. This frees up
the latter’s time and allows managers to supervise more workers.
This paper is most closely related to Garicano and Hubbard (2005) who examine positive
assortative matching between partners and associates in law firms in Texas.3 Using data on
lawyers’ school of education and firm of employment, they find that associates are more likely
to work at the same firm as partners who went to a similarly ranked school, consistent with
positive assortative matching. The nature of their data, however, does not permit them to obtain
a measure of workers’ ability that varies across individuals who graduated from the same school.
In addition their analysis is limited to two-layer firms: partners and associates. My dataset and
classification strategy allow me to make progress on this issue, since I can identify up to four
layers in firms. Finally, another distinction is that I examine the mechanism that is causing this
sorting pattern: higher ability managers supervising larger teams.
More generally, this paper is also related to a large empirical literature examining sorting
in labor markets. In particular, this literature is concerned with whether productive workers are
matched with productive firms (see for example Abowd et al. (2003), Abowd et al. (2004), Martins
(2008), Andrews et al. (2008)). My paper examines a related but different question: how workers
sort with other workers in layers and firms.
My paper is most closely related to de Melo (2013), who uses matched employer-employee
data from Brazil to examine whether workers of similar ability sort into the same firms. While
Lopes de Melo focuses exclusively on whether workers of similar ability sort into the same
firm, I also examine how workers sort into the different layers of firms, and the mechanism
that is causing this pattern. In addition I make progress on an econometric issue associated
with testing whether higher ability workers sort into the same firms. Specifically, a positive
correlation between workers’ ability may be due to standard estimation error. I address this
issue by examining whether my findings hold in the year 2009, for individuals who have moved
to a firm that they have never been employed in before.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents a brief description of the management
hierarchy theory of a firm and its predictions. Section 3 introduces the data. Section 4 discusses
the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the descriptive statistics and summary results, Section
6 tests the model’s predictions, and Section 7 presents robustness checks. Finally, section 8
concludes.
3Iranzo et al. (2008) investigate whether production and non-production workers are complements or substitutes.
Although in their analysis, managers are contained in their non-production worker classification, they do not focus
on the relationship between managers and production workers.
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2 Model
In this section I briefly present the knowledge-based management hierarchy models from Gari-
cano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and discuss their main
implications. The models are concerned with the organization of teams and in this study I inter-
pret teams to be firms. To fix ideas, I first present the model where teams have three layers. For a
complete exposition and for all proofs, I refer the reader to Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004)
and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) and Antras et al. (2008).
2.1 Setup of the Model
In the model, a unit of output is produced only when a problem is solved. Problems are differen-
tiated by their difficulty and for simplicity, assume that the difficulty of problems is drawn from
a uniform distribution with support [0, 1]. Agents have one unit of time and are heterogeneous
in their level of knowledge.4 Agents’ knowledge determines their ability to solve problems, and
assume that knowledge is cumulative: an individual with knowledge z can solve all problems in
the interval [0, z].5
Production occurs in teams. Teams are composed of one layer of production workers, who
spend their one unit of time drawing problems and attempt to solve them, and layers of man-
agers who do not draw problems but instead spend all of their time solving problems that their
production workers cannot solve.6 For managers to receive problems that other agents can-
not solve, communication is possible between managers and production workers within a team.
Communication, however, entails a cost to the managers of a team.
In a team, production workers draw one problem per unit of time and if they can solve the
problem a unit of output is produced. Otherwise, they ask their manager in the immediate layer
above who in turn spends a fraction of her time communicating with the worker. If the manager
knows the solution to the problem, then she conveys the solution to her worker who immediately
produces a unit of output. If the manager does not know the solution, the production worker
asks the manager two layers above. This process continues until the problem is solved, or the
production worker has seen a manager in every layer of the team, at which point the problem
remains unsolved and nothing is produced.
Consider a team composed of three layers, one manager in layer three with knowledge z3m,
n2m managers in layer two with knowledge z2m and n1p production workers in layer one with
4I abstract from the decision to acquire knowledge. For a model where agents acquire knowledge see Garicano
and Rossi-Hansberg (2006).
5The output of such an individual from working alone is therefore:
y(z) = z. (1)
6In other words, production workers specialize in routine tasks (i.e. production), while managers specialize in
nonrountine tasks (i.e. problem solving).
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knowledge z1p.7 Let h denote the time cost per problem that a manager incurs communicating
with a production worker and assume that this cost is the same across all managers. The number
of managers in layer two, n2m, is determined by the number of problems in the team, the fraction
of problems production workers cannot solve, and the communication costs. It is equal to:
n1ph[1− z1p] = n2m, (2)
where h[1− z1p] is the total cost per unit of time that a manager in layer two incurs while working
in a team composed of production workers with knowledge z1p. Similarly, since managers in layer
two can solve z2m fraction of problems, the time constraint of a manager in layer three is equal to:
n1ph[1− z2m] = 1, (3)
where h[1− z2m] is the total cost per unit of time that the top manager incurs while working in
a team composed of managers in layer two with knowledge z2m. The communication technology
therefore limits the amount of interactions managers can have with their subordinates, and this
in turn determines the number of production workers, n1p, and the number of managers in layer
two, n2m.
Furthermore, the output of the team is determined by number of problems in the team and
the fraction of problems the team solves. The latter is determined by the knowledge of the top
manager. Since the manager in layer three receives all problems that her production workers and
her managers in layer two cannot solve, and she can only solve a fraction z3m of them, the output
of the team is equal to:
y(z3m, z
2
m, z
1
p) = n
1
pz
3
m. (4)
This production framework has several important properties that determine the equilibrium
allocation of managers and production workers to teams. First, regardless of their occupation,
agents are not perfect substitutes in production. Second, in this framework matching is many
to one and because they share their knowledge with other agents in a team, managers increase
the value of their knowledge by concentrating on problems that only they can solve. Third,
production is asymmetrically sensitive to skill. Since they can leverage their knowledge over
many workers, managers are more important to the output of a team. And fourth, agents in the
different layers of a team are complements. The mechanism behind this result is the following.
Managers of greater knowledge can solve a greater proportion of problems, and thus render sub-
ordinates more productive. In turn, more knowledgeable subordinates increase the productivity
of their managers. Since all individuals have one unit of time, managers are constrained in the
number of agents that they can supervise and because they can solve a greater proportion of
7I slightly depart from the notation in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg
(2006) and refer to teams by the total number of layers instead of the number of management layers.
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problems on their own, more knowledgeable subordinates spend less time communicating with
managers which allows the latter to supervise larger teams.
In equilibrium the assignment of agents into occupations and teams has the following prop-
erties. First because production is asymmetrically sensitive to skill, there is skill stratification in
the sense that agents with greater knowledge sort into managerial occupations while agents with
lesser knowledge become production workers. Second because they are complements there is
positive assortative matching between agents in the different layers of teams. Third, managers of
greater knowledge supervise more subordinates and form larger teams, and fourth subordinates
of greater knowledge work in larger teams. These two properties follow from positive assortative
matching between agents in the different layers of teams and managers’ time constraint.
Furthermore, these results are generalizable to an economy where teams can have any num-
ber of layers (see Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) for details). An important point to note
is that any model with a production function that exhibits similar interactions between man-
agers and production workers will, in a general equilibrium, yield similar results (Garicano and
Hubbard (2008)).8 More specifically, as long as high skill agents raise the productivity of their
subordinates, and better individuals require less supervision, then in equilibrium high skill indi-
viduals will form teams with more and better subordinates in the layers below. These properties
are summarized in the proposition below:
Proposition 1 With L layer teams, the equilibrium assignment of individuals to occupations and teams
has the following properties:
• Individuals with the greatest knowledge sort into the top managerial occupations, individuals with
intermediate knowledge sort into managerial occupations, while individuals with least knowledge
become production workers.
• There is positive assortative matching between agents in the different layers of teams.
• For all layers, agents with greater knowledge are employed in larger teams and are supervised by less
individuals in the layers above.
• For all layers, managers with greater knowledge are employed in larger teams and supervise more
individuals in the layers below.
2.2 Discussion: Taking the Model to the Data
In this section thus far, I have presented the intuition of the model and its predictions. The
sections further below are concerned with testing the model’s predictions. The paper’s empirical
strategy relies on the idea that firms can be thought of as hierarchical teams, composed of layers
8Eeckhout and Kircher (2012) provide a general formulation of production in two-layer teams, and conditions
under which the equilibrium exhibits positive assortative matching and better managers supervise larger teams.
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in Economy with Two-Layer Firms
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that perform different tasks. Henceforth I will use teams and firms interchangeably. In addition,
in my analysis I relate agents’ knowledge in production to their productivity and their ability to
produce.9 Henceforth I will simply refer to agents’ knowledge as their ability.
To examine whether abler agents occupy the upper layers of firms I regress estimates of
workers’ ability on their position within firms. To examine whether there is positive assortative
matching between workers in the different layers of firms I build on recent tests suggested in
the literature investigating matching between workers and firms (de Melo (2013)), and estimate a
correlation between the average ability of workers in the different layers of firms. To test whether
abler managers supervise more subordinates, I rely on the equations that characterize managers’
time constraint. Equations (2) and (3) can be generalized to a firm with L layers. Rearranging,
taking logs, and defining the span of control of workers in layer l + 1 as the ratio of the size of
layer 1 to the size of layer l + 1 one obtains the following expression:
ln spanl+1 = ln
n1
nl+1
= ln h− ln[1− zl ].
(5)
where n1 denote the size of layer 1, nl+1 denotes the size of layer l+ 1 and zl denotes the ability of
agents in layer l. As managers occupy all other layers except layer 1, I drop the subscripts p and
m from the notation. These equations have the following characteristics in common: they are a
function of the number of production workers, and depend on the knowledge of the individuals
in the layer below. According to the model, therefore, managers’ span of control should be
increasing with their subordinates ability. To test this prediction, I approximate equation (5) with
the following equation:
9This is not an overly strong assumption. The knowledge-based hierarchy models of Garicano (2000) have a specific
formulation, however as mentioned above, any model with a production function that has the same interactions
between managers and production workers will yield similar results (Garicano and Hubbard (2008)).
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ln spanl+1 = γ0 + γ1ẑl + u, (6)
where ẑl represents my measure of the ability of agents in layer l and u is an error term. If the
mechanism described by the model, that determines how agents sort together into firms, holds
in the data then the estimated coefficient γ1 should be positive and significant.
Furthermore, since there is positive assortative matching, there is a one-to-one correspon-
dence between the ability of individuals in the different layers of a firm. Therefore, equation (5)
can also be rewritten as:
ln spanl+1 = ln h− ln[1− f (zl+1)]. (7)
where f () is a function that maps the ability of workers in layer l to layer l + 1; i.e. zl = f (zl+1).
I approximate equation (7) with the following equation:
ln spanl+1 = γ0 + γ1ẑl+1 + u, (8)
where ẑl+1 represents my measure of the ability of agents in layer l + 1 and u is an error term. If
the mechanism described by the model holds in the data then the estimated coefficient γ1 should
be positive and significant.10
Furthermore, the theory describes how agents sort together into firms. An important point
to note is the theory presented above is very general. The theory is silent on whether firms can
operate many establishments, in many industries or in many locations. It is likely that firms
operating in many industries and locations adopt a different organizational structure. Therefore,
in the sections below I take a strict interpretation of the model and examine its predictions only
on firms that operate in a single industry and a single location.11 The theory is also silent on
whether agents sort into industries and locations before they sort into firms. Indeed, it is likely
that the production technology and, in particular, the problems agents encounter are different
across industries. In the sections further below, I therefore present results with different sets of
controls so as to examine whether the model’s predictions hold in the aggregate economy, within
sectors, and within locations.
10To test for the mechanism I use both approaches because, as discussed below, workers’ ability is estimated from
data that do not contain all individuals in the economy.
11Firms operating in many industries are multi-product firms and their organization is likely to be affected to the
number of products that they produce. Also if firms operate in many locations, then it is likely that their organization
will have a different structure. See for example the study by Antras et al. (2008) for the case of firms operating in
different locations.
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3 Data Description & Classification of Layers
The data are extracted from the Déclarations Annuelles des Données Sociales (DADS), which are
provided and maintained by the French National Statistical Institute for Statistics and Economic
Studies (INSEE). The DADS are matched employer-employee datasets and are constructed from
administrative records that must be completed by all employers in France. A report must be
filled by each establishment for every one of its employees, so there is a unique record for each
employee-establishment-year combination. The DADS contains two datasets: a panel of workers
born in October and that runs from 1976 to 2009, and from 1993 to 2009, exhaustive cross-sections
of all workers in mainland France.12
In both the panel and cross-section datasets, for each observation, there is information on
employees’ characteristics, such as age, gender, and occupation, basic information on the es-
tablishment, such as location, industry and the parent firm, and basic firm level information,
such as the firm’s industry. For each observation there is also information on annual earnings,
denominated in 2007 euros, number of days worked, and number of hours worked.13
As discussed further below, I use the panel dataset to obtain measures of workers’ ability.
For computational tractability, I restrict the sample to the years 1993 to 2004, and to all full-
time workers who are born in October in an even numbered year, are between the ages 18 and
65 and work in mainland France. For the years 1993 to 2004, there are 4,999,728 observations,
corresponding to 753,092 workers in 399,676 firms. Appendix A and Abowd et al. (1999) provide
further details on the data and information on how wages are determined in France.
For the year 2004, I use information from the cross-section to measure the total number of
layers in firms and the size of each layer.14 In the management hierarchy theory of the firm by
Garicano (2000) a layer corresponds to a set employees who earn similar wages, are of similar
ability and perform tasks at a similar level of authority (Caliendo et al. (2014)).15 To construct the
different layers of firms, I adopt the strategy put forth by Caliendo et al. (2014), and use one-digit
occupational codes, which range from 2 to 6, to classify employees into layers.16 In total, I can
classify employees into four distinct layers. Layer 1 corresponds to qualified and non-qualified
administrative workers and blue-collar workers. It contains all workers with occupational codes
5 and 6. Layer 2 is composed of supervisors and individuals with a higher level of responsi-
12Until 1993 the DADS only contained information on individuals born in October in an even numbered year. From
1993 onwards, the DADS contains information on all individuals born in October.
13Information on the total number of hours worked is only available after 1993.
14Since the panel of the DADS is only a 5 percent sample of the population, it is not suitable to properly measure
the total number of layers and the size of each layer in a firm. Appendix A and Caliendo et al. (2014) provide further
details on the exhaustive cross-section data.
15The concept of a layer that I use is therefore independent of the actual occupations of employees, such as whether
they are lawyers, engineers or computer programmers. Instead it depends on their knowledge, productive ability, and
their relative position in the organizational hierarchy of firms. In addition, since firms are hierarchical, layers have the
added property that within a firm higher layers contain less workers who are of greater ability.
16The occupational codes range from 1 to 6. I have removed all firms operating in the agricultural and fishing
industries, which correspond to occupational code 1.
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Table 1: Description of Firms by Total Number of Layers
Total Average Average Median Standard Deviation
Number of Number of Number of Wage Ability Wage Ability Wage Ability
Layers employees hours
One
1st layer 11.00 11, 844.12 2.13 0.433 2.10 0.442 0.195 0.435
Two
1st layer 17.16 21, 874.82 2.18 0.347 2.14 0.358 0.231 0.411
2nd layer 2.71 4, 115.16 2.40 0.428 2.38 0.419 0.288 0.409
Three
1st layer 49.16 71, 431.91 2.33 0.352 2.27 0.357 0.321 0.375
2nd layer 11.72 19, 900.35 2.61 0.473 2.57 0.496 0.352 0.365
3rd layer 6.25 10, 350.94 2.96 0.580 2.96 0.594 0.349 0.402
Four
1st layer 58.57 85, 769.69 2.36 0.359 2.29 0.365 0.335 0.381
2nd layer 14.90 25, 643.13 2.64 0.501 2.61 0.519 0.361 0.372
3rd layer 8.91 14, 515.65 3.00 0.574 2.98 0.582 0.362 0.389
4th layer 1.22 2, 165.00 3.27 0.772 3.39 0.765 0.378 0.398
Notes: Descriptive statistics of firms that are in both the exhaustive cross-section and panel datasets of the DADS, for the year 2004. These
statistics are reported separately for firms with different number of layers. Column 1 refers to the layer within a firm. Columns 2 report the
average number of employees in a given layer, while column 3 reports the average number of hours worked by employees in a given layer. These
measures are obtained from the exhaustive cross-section of the DADS. Columns 4, 6 and 7 report the average log-hourly wages, median log-hourly
wages and standard deviation of log-hourly wages within a layer. Columns 5, 7 and 9 report the average ability, median ability and standard
deviation of ability of workers in a given layer. Measures of wages and ability values are obtained from the panel dataset of the DADS. Ability is
estimated from equation (9).
bility than ordinary workers, and contains all workers with an occupational code 4. Layer 3 is
composed of senior directors and top management staff and contains all workers with an occu-
pational code 3. And, layer 4 corresponds to owners who receive a wage and CEOs. It contains
all workers with occupational code 2.
Firms can have as many as four layers in their organization. I consider a firm to have a layer
if there is at least one employee in the exhaustive cross-section employed there and retain only
firms with at least one employee in layer 1.17 Finally, I merge the information from both the panel
and exhaustive cross-section datasets together, and retain only firms that operate in non-service
sectors, and firms that operate in only one industry and location.18 In all, the matched dataset
contains 18, 790 firms that operate in 17 industries, of which 2,160 are one-layer firms, 3,322 are
two-layer firms, 7,860 are three-layer firms and 5,450 are four-layer firms.19
Table 1 reports summary statistics of firms in the matched sample. In the table firms are
grouped by their organizational structure, their total number of layers. The average firm in the
17In other words, I remove firms that do not have any employees in layer 1. The appendix provides further details
on the construction of layers within firms.
18Locations correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France.
19Appendix A provides further information on the number of firms and workers by industry in the data. Unlike
the exhaustive cross-section, since the panel data is based on a 5 percent sample of the French population, it contains
information on a sample of firms operating in mainland France.
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sample has an organizational structure that is consistent with the knowledge-based management
hierarchical theory of a firm. On average lower layers of firms are larger than the layers above,
and contain workers that earn lower wages and are of lower ability. For example for the average
four-layer firm, layer 1 has 58.57 employees, layer 2 has 14.90 employees, layer 3 has 8.91 employ-
ees and layer 4 has 1.22 employees. The findings are similar if one measures the size of layers by
the number of hours worked. Returning again to four-layer firms, the average log-hourly wages
of workers in layer 4 are 3.27, the average log-hourly wages of workers in layer 3 are 3.00, and
the mean log-hourly wages of workers in layers 2 and 1 are 2.64 and 2.36 respectively. Therefore
there is a clear ranking in wages. The same ranking also holds for ability, where for example in
four-layer firms workers who reside in layer 4 have the greatest average ability, and are succeeded
by layers 3, 2, and 1.20 The classification of workers into layers, therefore has economic meaning.
The evidence is consistent with the view that firms are hierarchies, in the sense that higher layers
of a firm are smaller and contain workers earning higher wages and of greater ability.
4 Estimating Ability
To obtain measures of workers’ ability from the data, I use the empirical approach of Abowd
et al. (1999) which has been developed further by Card et al. (2013). I model log-hourly wages,
wit, of worker i in time t, as a linear function of a time-invariant worker component θi, a time-
invariant firm-layer component ψJ(i,l,t), time varying worker characteristics xit, and a mean-zero
error term eit. The equation to be estimated is:
ln wit = xitβ+ θi + ψJ(i,l,t) + eit. (9)
The term θi captures the portable part of a worker’s wages that remain with him as he moves
across firms, or layers within firms. The variation of this term reflects a worker’s productivity,
bargaining ability and labor market discrimination (Card et al. (2013)). In the subsequent anal-
ysis, I use θi as my measure of workers’ ability. The terms xit captures how workers’ earnings
evolve with changes in their observable attributes, such as labor market experience. In my esti-
mation, I use age as a proxy for experience and the list of time-varying controls in xit are age and
age squared, both interacted with gender.21 Although in theory, workers only form firms with
other workers, I include in equation (9) firm-layer fixed effects, ψJ(i,l,t), which are meant to iden-
tify firm attributes that affect every worker’s earnings in a given layer in a firm equally, such as
compensation policies, bargaining strength in the labor market, and productivity. Alternatively,
since not all workers are employed in the same firm throughout their career, one can interpret
the firm-layer fixed effects as partially accounting for any permanent influences past employees
20The following section explains how I estimate workers’ ability.
21Since in equation (9) age cannot be separately identified from worker and time fixed effects, I exclude any time
fixed effects from the analysis. Indeed one can show that age can be written as a linear combination of the time and
worker fixed effects.
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may have on the current organization, or any influences that affect individuals’ earnings in a
given layer of a firm that are the result of workers in the other layers.
To identify all of the econometric parameters in equation (9), I assume, as in Abowd et al.
(1999), that the error term eit is strictly exogenous. Under this assumption, the parameter β can
be consistently estimated as the number of workers, N, the number of firm-layers, J, and the
number of years, T, increases. The parameters θi and ψJ(i,l,t) can only be separately identified
by workers who switch employers, or layers within employers in the panel. In the dataset, there
are in total of 1,156,816 worker displacements. Since θi is an incidental parameter, consistent
estimates for it can only be obtained as the number of years a worker is observed grows large.
Table 1 in the Appendix A presents the distribution of the number of years a worker in observed
in the panel. Over 50 percent of workers are observed for 6 years or more. Similarly, ψJ(i,l,t) can
only be consistently estimated if the number of workers in a layer in a firm, or the number of
years grows large. Table 2 in the Appendix A presents the distribution of the number of workers
observed in a layer in a firm in a given year, as well as the number of years firms’ layers are
observed in the panel. The average number of workers in a layer in a firm is 2.67, and over 50
percent of firms’ layers are observed for 2 years or more.
To estimate equation (9) I focus on the largest connected group, that is the largest group of
layers within firms that, over the years, have had at least one employee in common with another
layer in the same or a different organization. In the panel, the largest connected group contains
753,092 workers and 569,198 layers within firms. To estimate equation (9), I use the algorithm put
forth by Guimaraes and Portugal (2010), which builds on the algorithm of Abowd et al. (2003).22
5 Results & Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 summarizes the estimation results from regression (9).23 To summarize my findings I
report the standard deviation of log-hourly wages, of the worker and firm-layer effects. I also
report the root mean squared error (RMSE) of the residuals and the adjusted R-squared of the
estimation. One important point to note is that the standard deviation of the worker effects is
less than the standard deviation of wages. In the model because workers of different abilities
are more productive from working in firms rather than alone, individuals’ wages are amplified
relative to their ability, and hence the standard deviation of wages is greater than the standard
deviation of abilities, consistent with the data.
In Table 2, I also report correlations. The correlation between the worker and firm-layer fixed
effects is −0.1636. This finding is similar to the empirical literature that investigates how workers
sort into firms. As many researchers report there is a negative correlation between worker and
22The solution of the algorithm provides a non-unique set of solutions for the worker and firm-layer fixed effects.
To render the effects unique the algorithm sets the average of the firm-layer fixed effects to zero.
23This table has a similar structure to Table III in Card et al. (2013).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics
Sample Year 1993− 2004
Worker and Firm-Layer Parameters
Number of Worker Effects 753, 092
Number of Firm-Layer Effects 569, 198
Summary of Parameter Estimates
St. Dev. of Wages 0.4417
St. Dev. of Worker Effects 0.3940
St. Dev. of Firm-Layer Effects 0.2508
RMSE of AKM Residual 0.1717
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8489
Correlations
Wages & Worker Effects 0.2509
Wages & Firm-Layer Effects 0.5073
Worker Effects & Firm-Layer Effects −0.1636
Comparison with the Match Effects Model
RMSE of Match Model 0.1490
Adjusted R-Squared 0.8862
ADDENDUM
Sample Size 4, 999, 728
Notes: Results from OLS estimation of equation (9). Xβ includes age and age squared interacted with gender. The match model includes Xβ and
a separate dummy for each worker-firm pair, corresponding to a job.
firm fixed effects, estimated from a log-linear wage equation.24 In my analysis, I abstract from
this correlation, since I am concerned with how employees in each layer of a firm match, rather
than how workers match with firms.25 Furthermore, the correlation between the individual fixed
effects and log-hourly wages is 0.2509. Therefore, individuals of higher ability earn more.
Table 2 also contains the adjusted R-squared and RMSE of a model with unrestricted match
effects, that is a separate dummy for each worker-firm-layer job spell. If match effects are an
important determinant of workers’ wages, then a model with worker-firm-layer match effects
should provide a markedly better fit to the data. The match effects model has an adjusted R-
squared of 0.8862 and a RMSE of 0.1490, while the adjusted R-squared from the estimation of
equation (9) is 0.8489 and the RMSE is 0.1717. The match effects model, therefore, fits the data
slightly better than a specification with separate worker and firm-layer effects. Although this
indicates that a match component is present in wages, the improvement in fit is modest.
As in Card et al. (2013), I further examine the importance of a match component to wages. In
particular, I examine the wage dynamics of all individuals who changed firms, or layers within
firms, in the years 1993 to 2004 with at least two consecutive years in the new and old position. I
24See for example the studies Abowd et al. (2003), Abowd et al. (2004), Martins (2008), Andrews et al. (2008).
25The approach in this paper is therefore consistent with the papers of de Melo (2013) and Eeckhout and Kircher
(2011).
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classify the origin and destination positions by the quartile of the estimated firm-layer effects and
calculate the average hourly wages of agents in each cell two years before and after the move. I
report the results in Table A1. If the error term in equation (9) is exogenous, changes in the wages
of individuals who transition from one quartile to the other should be relatively symmetric, and
individuals who move to new firms, or layer within firms, within the same quartile should
not experience a wage gain. In addition, the increase in wages of workers who transition to
different quartiles should be monotonically increasing with the distance of the quartiles.26 These
conditions hold in Table A1. As a visual aide Figure 2 panel (a) illustrates the wage profiles of
workers in the first and fourth quartiles. The gains or losses of individuals who transition to
quartiles is monotonically increasing with the distance between the quartiles, and the gains or
losses are relatively symmetric. Panel (b) illustrates the wage profiles of workers that remain
within the same quartile. These profiles are relatively flat. Therefore, at a minimum, the model
in equation (9) is a relatively decent first approximation to wages.
6 Tests
6.1 Examining Sorting into Layers: Skill Stratification
I first test for skill stratification, that abler individuals occupy the upper layers of firms.27 For
individual i employed in firm j(i), I estimate the following equation:
layerLj(i) = µ0 + µ1abilityi + Xj(i) + uj(i), (10)
where layerLj(i) is the layer in firm j with a total number of L layers that worker i occupies, abilityi
is the estimated ability of worker i, and Xj(i) are industry and location controls.28 Equation (10)
is estimated across firms with the same total number of layers, separately. In equation (10) the
interest is in how agents sort into layers and if abler individuals occupy the upper layers of
organizations then µ1 will be positive and significant.
Table 3 reports regression results. Each entry in the table reports the estimated coefficient of
µ1. Because of the large number of indicator variables in the regressions, I estimate equation (10)
26Consider a worker employed in layer 1 in Firm 1 in period t who moves to layer 1 in Firm 2 in period t+ 1. Ignoring
the returns to observables, his expected change in wages is equal to: E[wit+1 − wit|J(i, l, t + 1) = {1, 2} , J(i, l, t) =
{1, 1}] = ψ1,2−ψ1,1 + E[eit+1− eit|J(i, l, t+ 1) = {1, 2} , J(i, l, t) = {1, 1}]. Similarly, the expected change in wages of a
worker moving in the other direction is equal to: E[wit+1 − wit|J(i, l, t + 1) = {1, 1} , J(i, l, t) = {1, 2}] = ψ1,1 − ψ1,2 +
E[eit+1 − eit|J(i, l, t + 1) = {1, 1} , J(i, l, t) = {1, 2}]. Therefore if the error term is strictly exogenous both expressions
are simply equal to ψ1,2 − ψ1,1 and ψ1,1 − ψ1,2. See Card et al. (2013) for further explanations.
27Examining whether this sorting pattern is present in the data is important because it confirms that workers in
a layer are abler than their subordinates. If this were not the case then the model’s prediction are false. Further
the argument made in the model is that organizations exist to optimally utilize the knowledge of their workers.
By shielding knowledgeable agents from easy tasks, a hierarchy allows abler individuals to focus on solving more
complex or harder problems, while lower ability individuals focus on easier or commoner problems. This implies that
within a firm, higher ability agents occupy the upper layers of organizations.
28There are 17 industries in the dataset and locations correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France.
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Table 3: Regression Results for Skill Stratification
Total
Number Sample
of Layers Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TWO 4, 432 0.053∗∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.041
(0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.035)
THREE 19, 841 0.369∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017)
FOUR 16, 003 0.469∗∗∗ 0.446∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.428∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No
Area FE No No Yes Yes No
Firm FE No No No No Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) in parentheses. OLS regressions for equation (10).
Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers. The table only reports the value of the
coefficient µ1 from equation (10). The left-hand side variable is the layer that a worker occupies. The right-hand side variable is the ability of the
worker. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France.
using OLS. Rows 1 to 3 contain the results for firms with 2, 3 and 4 layers in their organization,
respectively. The first column in Table 3 indicates the total number of layers in firms, the second
column contains the sample size of the regressions, and the third to seventh columns report the
estimated value of the coefficient, µ1. All the standard errors are bootstrapped and based on 500
replications.
The regressions in column (1) report how agents sort into layers across firms, industries
and locations. In all three regressions the coefficients are positive and significant at the one
percent level. The column indicates that an individual with a one hundred percent increase in
his ability and employed in a two-layer firm will on average reside 0.053 layers higher, while if
he is employed in an organization with three-layers he will on average reside 0.369 layers higher
and if he is employed in a four-layer firm he will on average reside 0.469 layers higher.
Even within industries and locations, Table 3 reports that higher ability agents occupy the
upper layers of firms. To examine how agents sort into layers within industries, in column (2) I
include industry fixed effects. The coefficients remain positive and significant at the one percent
level. In column (3) I include location fixed effects so as to examine how agents sort into layers
within locations. The coefficients in column (3) remain positive and significant. And finally,
in column (4) I include both industry and location fixed effects. The findings indicate that an
individual with a one hundred percent increase in his ability and employed in a two-layer firm
will on average reside 0.043 layers higher, if he is employed in a three-layer firm will on average
reside 0.336 layers higher, and if he is employed in an organization with four layers he will on
average reside 0.428 layers higher. Therefore even within industries and within locations abler
individuals occupy the upper layers of organizations.
16
The regressions in column (5) contain firm fixed effects and examine how agents sort into lay-
ers within firms. In two out of three regressions, the coefficient µ1 is positive and significant at
the one percent level. For four-layer firms, the result indicates that an individual with a one hun-
dred percent increase in his ability will on average reside 0.511 layers higher. For organizations
with three layers an agent with one hundred percent increase in his ability will on average reside
0.411 layers higher. Within three and four-layer firms, therefore, abler individuals are employed
in the upper layers of organizations.
In column (5), the value of µ1 for two-layer firms is 0.041 and is not significant at the ten
percent level. This would suggest that within two-layer firms, higher ability agents are not
sorting into the upper layers of organizations. However, in light of the fact that the coefficient
of µ1 in column (5) is similar in magnitude to column (4), and that in the average two-layer firm
there are 1.3 observations in the dataset, these findings are inconclusive.
To summarize from the evidence presented in Table 3 one can conclude that there is skill
stratification, in the sense that abler agents occupy the higher layers of organizations. In other
words, agents in higher layers of firms are of greater ability than their subordinates in the layers
below. I now proceed to examine whether there is positive assortative matching between agents
in the different layers of firms, and whether the mechanism that determines the sorting pattern
is as suggested by the model.
6.2 Examining Sorting into Teams: Positive Assortative Matching
I now test for positive assortative matching between workers in the different layers of firms.29
According to the knowledge-based management theory of firms layers are composed of workers
who are of similar ability. A representative measure of a layer’s ability is the weighted average
ability of workers occupying a layer.30 More specifically, let Nlj and H
l
j denote the number of
individuals and the total number of hours in layer l at firm j, and Hlj(i) denote the number of
hours performed by individual i in layer l in firm j. A representative measure of the ability of all
workers in layer l at firm j is the following:
abilitylj =
Nlj
∑
i=1
Hlj(i)
Hlj
abilityi. (11)
where the summation is taken over all individuals in layer l at firm j.31
29Appendix B contains additional tests for positive assortative matching. Appendix B tests whether better workers
sort into organizations with better co-workers. I adopt the approach of de Melo (2013), and investigate whether
a worker’s fixed effect is positively correlated with that of his co-workers. I conduct this analysis across several
dimensions and find evidence in favor of positive assortative matching.
30I use a weighted average to account for the fact that some workers may be employed for the full year in a firm. In
such a case, these workers cannot have the same impact on a firm, as workers who have been employed for the entire
year.
31Note that this construction is only possible for layers where I there is at least one employee in the panel dataset
of the DADS. As the panel is only a five percent sample of the French population, for many firms abilitylj remains
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In firms with the same organization, positive assortative matching implies there should be a
positive correlation between the ability of workers in the different layers of firms. For example,
when comparing two two-layer firms, the firm with the better production workers in layer 1 will
also employ the better managers in layer 2. To test for positive assortative matching I therefore
estimate the following equation:
abilitylj = α0 + α1ability
l−g
j + Xjβ+ uj, (12)
where abilitylj is the estimated weighted average ability of all workers in firm j who are in layer
l, and abilityl−gj is the estimated weighted average ability of all workers in firm j who are in
layer l − g, for g = 1, .., l − 1. The firm controls Xj are firm observable variables such as firm
age, an indicator for whether the firm already existed in the first year I have information, 1976,
as well as indicator variables for industry and location. I include industry and location fixed
effects because the assignment of workers to layers and firms may be different across industries
and locations. I estimate equation (12), for firms with the same organizational structure and for
the different values of l and g. In equation (12) the interest is how abilitylj varies with ability
l−g
j
across firms with the same total number of layers. If there is a positive assortative matching, then
the coefficient α1 will be positive and significant.
Table 4 reports results. Each entry in the table illustrates the estimated coefficient of α1
between two layers. The first column indicates the total number of layers in firms. The second
column indicates the layer for which weighted average ability is the left-hand-side variable in
equation (12), and the third column indicates the layer for which weighted average ability is
the right-hand-side variable in equation (12). The fourth column reports the sample size of the
regressions, while the fifth to tenth columns report estimated values of the coefficient.32 In Table
4 all the standard errors are bootstrapped and based on 500 replications.
Column (1) contains no controls and tests how agents sort together into firms across industries
and locations. In these regressions, the majority of the estimated values of α1 are positive and
significant, indicating that across industries and locations there is positive assortative matching.
For example, in organizations with four layers, a one unit increase in the average ability of
workers in layer one is associated with a 0.341 average increase in the average ability of workers
in layer two.
Even within industries and locations, there is evidence of positive assortative matching. Col-
umn (2) contains industry fixed effects and examines how agents sort together within industries,
undefined.
32In Table 4 sample sizes vary across regressions and holding organization fixed, sample sizes increase when equa-
tion (12) is estimated with lower layers. For example, in regressions with four-layer firms the sample can be as small
as 15 observations or as large as 1, 249 observations. The reasons are twofold. First given the nature of the data, I
do not observe workers in all layers of firms. And second, in the data I am more likely to observe a worker in the
lower layer of an organization. That is if firms are hierarchies then there are more workers in the lower layers of firms.
Therefore in a 1/12 random sample of the population of workers one is more likely to observe individuals employed
in the lower layers of firms.
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Table 4: Regression Results for Sorting Tests
Total
Number of layer layer Sample
Layers l l-g Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TWO 2 1 142 0.103 0.116 0.004 0.145 0.110 0.155
(0.092) (0.097) (0.163) (0.228) (0.092) (0.302)
THREE 3 2 457 0.240∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.223∗∗∗ 0.224∗∗∗ 0.241∗∗∗ 0.227∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.071) (0.081) (0.083) (0.069) (0.083)
THREE 3 1 662 0.302∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.279∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ 0.303∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064) (0.078) (0.081) (0.063) (0.081)
THREE 2 1 1385 0.233∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.235∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.037) (0.033) (0.037)
FOUR 4 3 15 0.636∗ 0.691
(0.370) (0.479)
FOUR 4 2 22 −0.181 −0.118
(0.290) (0.282)
FOUR 4 1 37 0.333 0.363 0.559 0.417
(0.300) (0.256) (1.189) (0.322)
FOUR 3 2 452 0.195∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.169∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.167∗
(0.061) (0.065) (0.082) (0.099) (0.061) (0.101)
FOUR 3 1 687 0.077 0.072 0.115 0.117 0.075 0.118
(0.057) (0.059) (0.072) (0.076) (0.056) (0.077)
FOUR 2 1 1249 0.341∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗ 0.322∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.045) (0.055) (0.056) (0.045) (0.057)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Area FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Firm Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) in parentheses. OLS regressions for equation (12).
Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers and across two layers of firms. The table
only reports the value of the coefficient α1 from equation (12). The left-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in
layer l. The right-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in a lower layer, l − g. Industry fixed effects correspond
to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm controls include the age of the firm, and
whether the firm was present in the first year of the panel, 1976. Entries are omitted when sample sizes are too small.
while column (3) contains location fixed effects and examines how agents sort together within
locations. In most cases the coefficients are positive and significant, suggesting that even within
industries or within locations, the best workers team up with the best workers in other layers of
firms. Column (4) reports regression results with both industry and location fixed effects. The
findings indicate that there is positive assortative matching. For example, in organizations with
four layers, a one hundred percent increase in the average ability of workers in layer one is asso-
ciated with 0.322 average increase in the average ability of workers in layer two. In standardized
units, this implies that a one standard deviation increase in the average ability of agents in layer
one corresponds to a 0.301 standard deviation increase in the average ability of agents in layer
two.
Column (5) in Table 4 reports results of regressions with firm observables as controls. Almost
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all of the coefficients are positive and half are significant. Finally column (6) reports results
with the full set of controls, industry, location and firm observables. The coefficients remain
positive and significant. For example, in organizations with three layers, a one hundred percent
increase in the average ability of workers in layer one is associated with 0.237 average increase
in the average ability of workers in layer two, and with a 0.292 average increase in the ability
of workers in layer three. To obtain a sense of the strength of this relationship, a one standard
deviation increase in the average ability of agents in layer two, corresponds to a 0.224 and 0.259
standard deviation increase in the average ability of agents in layers two and three, respectively.
One observation from Table 4 is that the magnitudes of α1 are small. A small magnitude, how-
ever, is not necessarily inconsistent with the theory, since the assignment of agents into teams
depends on the parameters of the model, and in particular on the distribution of abilities in the
economy.33 Furthermore, nearly all of the coefficients reported in Table 4 have a positive sign.
There are two notable exceptions. In row six the coefficients between the ability of workers in
layers four and two in four-layer firms are negative but not significant. In both cases, however,
the reported coefficients are imprecise. Because the sample sizes are small relative to the number
of control variables there is not much independent variation in the data, which may also account
for the reported negative coefficients. In both cases results are inconclusive. In addition, there
are several rows in Table 4 where although the coefficients are positive, they are never significant.
For example, in organizations with four layers, there appears to be no relationship between the
average ability of agents in layers three and one. The same results hold for two-layer organiza-
tions. This suggests that there is no sorting between agents in these layers, however the fact that
the coefficients are always positive indicates that there is a relationship in the data, albeit not
strong.34
To summarize the results, out of the possible 50 estimated coefficients, 28 are positive and
significant at the five percent level, 3 are positive and significant at the ten percent level, 17 are
positive but not significant, and 2 are negative and not significant. Therefore, apart for two-layer
firms, these results provide evidence that there is positive assortative matching between workers
in different layers of firms.
6.3 Examining the Mechanism
Until now, I have found evidence that higher ability agents sort into the higher layers of firms and
that there is positive assortative matching between the workers in the different layers of firms. I
now proceed to examine whether the model’s mechanism is behind the sorting pattern observed
33The small magnitudes for α1 are not problematic. If one were to assume a continuum of agents, as in Antras et al.
(2006), then the mass of managers will be smaller than the mass of production workers. In this case, the matching
function would have a slope that is less than 1.
34For two-layer firms, this is consistent with the findings in table 3, which report that there is little evidence of
sorting between agents and layers in firms.
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in the data and test whether agents’ span of control increases with their subordinates’ ability.35
Let HRlj denote the total number of hours worked by all employees in layer l at firm j. I
define the span of control of workers in layer l as:
spanlj =
HR1j
HRlj
. (13)
In words, my measure of the span of control of workers in layer l is the ratio of the total number
of hours in layer 1, to the number of hours in layer l.36 The argument is that all workers in layer
l supervise Nlj individuals in layer 1, and these individuals spend a total of HR
1
j hours at the
firm. Dividing by the total number of hours worked by employees in layer l, HRlj, one obtains
the number of hours a worker in layer l is expected to devote to supervising individuals in layer
1. This definition of span of control is directly related to firms’ time constraint and is invariant
to the number of hours in the highest layer of the organization.37
In the model, managers benefit from working with abler subordinates because they require
less supervision, which allows managers to supervise more workers. In equilibrium, abler man-
agers form teams with abler subordinates and their span of control is increasing with their sub-
ordinates’ ability. To examine whether the model’s mechanism holds in the data I estimate the
following equation:
ln spanlj = γ0 + γ1ability
l−1
j + Xjβ+ uj, (14)
where abilityl−1j is the estimated weighted average ability of all workers in firm j who are in layer
l − 1, and spanlj is defined above. The controls Xj are firm age, whether the firm was present in
1976, and indicator variables for industry and location. I estimate equation (14) for firms with
the same number of layers and for different values of l, separately. In equation (14) the interest
is in how the span of control of agents in layer l varies with the ability of agents in the layer
below. If there is positive assortative matching between workers in the different layers of firms,
and abler subordinates render their superiors more productive by allowing them to supervise
more workers, then γ1 should be positive and significant.
Table 5 reports regression results. The table has a similar structure to Table 4. Each entry
in the table reports an estimated value of the coefficient γ1. The first column reports the total
number of layers in firms. The second column reports the layer for which weighted average
ability is the right-hand-side variable in equation (14), the third column reports the sample size
35In the appendix I also examine whether agents’ span of control increases with their ability. Given that both
approaches examine the same question, and the findings are more conclusive when I examine how agents’ span of
control varies with their subordinates’ ability, I relegate the latter analysis to the appendix.
36Since I cannot observe reporting relationships within organizations, this is the only measure available. I obtain
HRlj from the exhaustive cross-section of the DADS.
37In the Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) and Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) all workers have one unit of
time available. Also, the number of workers in the top layer of a firm is normalized to one.
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Table 5: Testing Mechanism - Subordinates’ Ability
Total
Number of layer Sample
Layers l-1 Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TWO 1 2863 −0.070 −0.098∗ −0.031 −0.068 −0.055 −0.061
(0.055) (0.054) (0.058) (0.056) (0.055) (0.056)
THREE 1 6430 −0.077∗∗ −0.035 −0.060∗ −0.032 −0.070∗ −0.028
(0.035) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035)
THREE 2 2413 −0.271∗∗∗ −0.173∗∗ −0.206∗∗ −0.158∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.149∗
(0.080) (0.075) (0.086) (0.084) (0.079) (0.084)
FOUR 1 4494 −0.143∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗ −0.115∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗
(0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045) (0.043)
FOUR 2 1918 −0.161∗∗ −0.089 −0.084 −0.067 −0.158∗∗ −0.067
(0.081) (0.073) (0.085) (0.079) (0.080) (0.078)
FOUR 3 1042 0.198 0.273∗∗ 0.249∗ 0.316∗∗ 0.218∗ 0.334∗∗
(0.133) (0.124) (0.147) (0.143) (0.131) (0.143)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Area FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Firm Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regressions for equation
(14). Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers. The table only reports the value of
the coefficient γ1 from equation (14). The left-hand side variable is the span of control of agents in layer l. The right-hand side variable is the
estimated weighted average ability of workers in a lower layer, l − 1. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects
correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the
first year of the panel, 1976.
of the regressions, and the fourth to ninth columns report estimated values of γ1.38 In Table 5 all
the standard errors are bootstrapped and based on 500 replications.
Column (1) contains no controls and examines how span of control varies with the ability of
agents in the layer below across industries and locations. In these regressions the majority of the
estimated values of γ1 are negative, indicating that the model’s mechanism does not hold in the
data and span of control is decreasing with workers’ ability. For example in three-layer firms a
one unit increase in the average ability of workers in layer two is on average associated with a
27.1 percent decrease in the span of control of workers in layer three.
Within industries and locations, there is evidence that abler agents limit their managers’ span
of control but there is also evidence in favor of the model’s mechanism. Column (2) contains
industry fixed effects and examines how agents’ span of control varies with their subordinates’
ability within industries, while column (3) examines the relationship within locations. In both
models the majority of regressions indicate abler workers limit their managers’ span of control.
38Note that the reported sample sizes in Table 5 vary across regressions. For example, in regressions with four-
layer firms the sample size can be as small 1,042 observations or as large as 4,494 observations. The sample size also
increases in regressions examining the mechanism in the lower layers of firms. As explained previously, this is not
surprising given nature of the dataset and, because firms are hierarchies in the dataset there are less employees in the
higher layers of firms. Also the reported sample sizes are different from Table 4, since to estimate equation (14) only
the ability of one employee in a layer has to be recorded in the dataset.
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The only exception is in the last row of the table, where in four-layer firms there is evidence that
abler workers allow their managers to supervise larger teams. For example, within industries in
four-layer firms a unit increase in the average ability of workers in layer three is associated with
a 27.3 percent increase in the span of control of workers in layer four. Column (4) reports results
with both location and industry controls. The results remain the same: apart for layer four in
four-layer firms the evidence indicates that abler agents supervise smaller teams.
Column (5) reports results with firm observables as controls. In column (5) four coefficients
are negative and significant at the ten percent level while one is positive and significant. Finally
column (6) reports results with the full set of controls, industry, location and firm observables.
With the exception of the last row, there is evidence that abler agents limit the number of workers
managers’ supervise. For example in three-layer firms a one unit increase in the average ability of
workers in layer two is associated with a 14.9 percent decrease in the span of control of workers
in layer three. In four-layer firms the relationship however remains positive and significant, and
indicates that a one unit increase in the average ability of workers in layer three is associated with
a 33.4 percent increase in the span of control of workers in layer four. In light of these results,
only in layer four in organizations with four layers, is there evidence to suggest that the model’s
mechanism is present in the data.
To summarize the results reported in Table 5, out of the 36 estimated coefficients, 13 are
negative and significant at the five percent level, 5 are negative and significant at the ten percent
level, 12 are negative but not significant, 5 are positive and significant at the ten percent level,
and 1 is positive but not significant. Hence overall the evidence is mixed. There is limited
evidence in favor of the mechanism described by the model, and evidence to suggest that the
opposite is taking place: abler managers form teams with abler production workers, however,
these production workers take up more of the managers’ time, which limits the amount of agents
managers can supervise.
Additionally, as long as all agents perform the same tasks in firms, the size of each layer is
determined by the same constraint and better workers form teams with better workers in the
other layers of firms, it is incompatible for higher ability managers to supervise less workers and
for higher ability workers to be employed in larger teams.39 These results therefore indicate that
it may be the case that different mechanisms are behind the sorting pattern observed in the data,
and that firms are organizing production in different ways.40 In some firms, abler managers
supervise a greater number of abler workers, while in other firms abler managers supervise a
smaller number of abler workers. I next section I explore whether there is any heterogeneity in
the way firms organize production.
In contrast, it may also be the case that agents in the different layers of firms do not perform
the same tasks or the size of each layer is determined by a different constraint, and so it may be
39For example, in Garicano (2000) all agents solve problems to produce output and so the size of each layer is
determined by the same time constraint.
40In other words, the regressions thus far have only been estimating an average correlation across firms.
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the case that the relationship between managers’ span of control and their subordinates’ ability
varies within the different layers of firms. For some layers better subordinates may allow their
managers to supervise more workers, while in other layers better subordinates may limit the
number of workers their managers can supervise. For example because of the different tasks
agents perform, in a four-layer firm it may be the case that in layers one and two managers’ span
of control decreases with their subordinates’ ability, while in layers three and four managers’ span
of control increases with their subordinates’ ability. To date, there has been no theoretical model
that can justify such an organizational structure and so there are not any empirical predictions
that I can examine in the data.
6.4 Additional Results
Together the results in the previous section suggest that, although there is evidence of positive
assortative matching between workers in the different layers of firms, not all firms are organizing
their production in a uniform way. To investigate whether this is the case, in this section I ex-
amine the data more closely. I proceed in three steps. First, I examine whether the relationships
hold for mono-establishment firms, that is firms that consist of only one plant. Second, I examine
whether the findings in the previous section are the same across industries with different degrees
of technological intensity. And third, I examine whether the findings are the same across indus-
tries with different degrees of product differentiation. In this section I only report results for
regressions that examine whether the model’s mechanism is behind the sorting pattern observed
in the data with the full set of controls, industry, location and firm observables. To provide a
complete analysis of the data, I report regression results that examine whether managers’ span
of control increases with their subordinates’ ability as well as results that examine whether man-
agers’ span of control increases with their own ability.41 Results for regressions that examine
how agents sort into layers and how agents sort together into teams are in the appendix.
First, it may be the case that reporting relationships are only specific to a physical location.
In particular if a firm is operating multiple plants, their organization may be different than what
is suggested by the theory. To account for this, in Table 6 I report regression results for mono-
establishment organizations.42 Column (1) reports regression results that examine how the span
of control of workers in layer l varies with the average ability of workers in layer l − 1, while
column (2) reports results that examine how the span of control of workers in layer l varies with
their average ability. In Table 6 the results are similar to those reported in the previous section.
Apart for the span of control of agents in layer four, the estimated values of γ1 are negative.
Therefore, the conclusion remains the same. There is limited evidence in favor of the mechanism
described by the model, and evidence to suggest that the agents’ span of control is decreasing
with ability.
41Given that there is positive assortative matching, both types of regressions should yield similar results.
42This removes 924 firms from the dataset.
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Table 6: Testing Mechanism - Mono-Establishment Firms
Total Total
Number of layer Sample Number of layer Sample
Layers l-1 Size (1) Layers l Size (2)
TWO 1 2723 −0.072 TWO 2 591 −0.135
(0.058) (0.192)
THREE 1 6140 −0.033 THREE 2 2309 −0.046
(0.038) (0.078)
THREE 2 2309 −0.161∗ THREE 3 1120 −0.075
(0.085) (0.112)
FOUR 1 4203 −0.100∗∗ FOUR 2 1783 −0.061
(0.048) (0.066)
FOUR 2 1783 −0.058 FOUR 3 952 −0.102
(0.083) (0.131)
FOUR 3 952 0.270∗ FOUR 4 82
(0.154)
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regressions for equations (15)
and (14) . Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers. The table only reports the value of
the coefficient γ1 from equations with the full set of controls. The left-hand side variable is the span of control of agents in layer l. In column (1)
the right-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in a lower layer, l− 1. In column (2) the right-hand side variable
is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in layer l. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond
to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the first year of
the panel, 1976. Entries are omitted when sample sizes are too small.
Second, it may be the case firms using different technologies organize their production dif-
ferently. To account for this, I use the OECD (2003) classification of technological intensity to
group industries into four categories of technological intensity, low, medium-low, medium-high
and high, and re-estimate equation (14) with the right-hand side variable interacted with the
technological intensity of the industry.43 Table 7 report results. From Table 7 a weak pattern
emerges. When it is significantly different from zero, in high technology industries γ1 is neg-
ative, while in medium-low technology industries the opposite is the case. For example across
organizations with three layers, in medium-low technology firms a unit a one unit increase in
the average ability of workers in layer two is associated with a 25.5 percent increase in the span
of control of workers in layer three, while in high technology firms it is associated with a 49.6
percent decrease. Furthermore, in Table 8 I conduct the same analysis but replace the right-hand
side variable with the average ability of workers in layer l. A similar pattern is also present in
Table 8. For example, across three-layer organizations, in medium-low technology firms a one
unit increase in the average ability of workers in layer two is on average associated with a 29.8
percent increase in their span of control, while in high technology firms it is associated with a
58.2 percent decrease. Therefore, there is some weak evidence suggesting that the mechanism
described by the model holds in firms operating in medium to low technology industries, while
in high technology industries the evidence suggests that abler agents supervise less workers.
43See Appendix A for further details.
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Table 7: Testing Mechanism - Technology Intensity: Subordinates’ Ability
Total
Number of layer Sample
Layers l-1 Size Low Medium-Low Medium-High High
TWO 1 2674 −0.074 −0.073 −0.066 0.434
(0.085) (0.097) (0.152) (0.303)
THREE 1 5868 −0.045 0.013 −0.086 −0.028
(0.058) (0.057) (0.092) (0.200)
THREE 2 2208 −0.200 0.255∗ −0.115 −0.496∗
(0.135) (0.149) (0.180) (0.298)
FOUR 1 4109 −0.112 −0.060 −0.137 −0.185
(0.069) (0.074) (0.096) (0.190)
FOUR 2 1764 −0.058 0.027 −0.090 −0.505∗
(0.155) (0.158) (0.161) (0.258)
FOUR 3 953 0.398 0.095 0.181 −0.202
(0.270) (0.286) (0.313) (0.369)
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regressions for equation (14).
Each row displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers. The table only reports the value of the
coefficient γ1 interacted with industries degree of technological intensity, for regressions with the full set of controls. The left-hand side variable
is the span of control of workers in layer l. The right-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in a lower layer,
l − 1. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm
controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the first year of the panel, 1976.
Third, firms’ organization may also depend on the type of product they are producing. It
may be the case that firms producing differentiated products are required to organize differently
than firms producing homogeneous products, either because the production process is different
across goods, or because the level of product market competition is different across markets.
To account for this, I use the Rauch (1999) classification of goods to group industries into two
categories of product differentiation, low and high, and re-estimate equations with the right-
hand side variable interacted with the degree of production differentiation of the industry.44
Table 9 report results and in Table 9 a very weak pattern emerges. In the few cases where it
is significantly different from zero, γ1 is negative in highly differentiated industries, while in
industries with a low degree of product differentiation γ1 is positive. For example across four-
layer organizations, in industries with a low degree of product differentiation a one unit increase
in the average ability of workers in layer three is on average associated with a 58.8 percent
increase in the span of control of workers in layer four, while in industries with a high degree of
product differentiation a unit increase in the average ability of workers in layer one is associated
with a 12.3 decrease in the span of control of workers in layer two. Therefore, there is some
weak evidence suggesting that the mechanism described by the model holds in firms operating
in non-differentiated industries, while in highly differentiated industries the evidence suggests
that abler agents supervise less workers.
44See Appendix A for further details.
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Table 8: Testing Mechanism - Technology Intensity: Managers’ Ability
Total
Number of layer Sample
Layers l Size Low Medium-Low Medium-High High
TWO 2 571 −0.154 −0.091 0.055 −0.142
(0.303) (0.374) (0.456) (0.420)
THREE 2 2208 0.034 0.298∗∗ −0.105 −0.582∗∗
(0.126) (0.143) (0.178) (0.251)
THREE 3 1090 0.190 −0.227 −0.114 −0.586∗∗
(0.184) (0.202) (0.289) (0.289)
FOUR 2 1764 −0.042 0.067 −0.149 −0.159
(0.120) (0.131) (0.136) (0.229)
FOUR 3 953 0.089 −0.084 −0.349 −0.070
(0.232) (0.183) (0.255) (0.335)
FOUR 4 76
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regressions for equation (15).
Each row displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers. The table only reports the value of the
coefficient γ1 interacted with industries degree of technological intensity, for regressions with the full set of controls. The left-hand side variable
is the span of control of workers in layer l. The right-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in layer l. Industry
fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm controls include
the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the first year of the panel, 1976. Entries are omitted when sample sizes are too small.
7 Robustness Checks
7.1 Inconsistent Estimates
There are three threats to my estimates of workers’ ability. All stem from my estimation of worker
fixed effects. First, because the worker fixed effects are incidental parameters from regression
(9), consistent estimates for them can only be obtained as the number of years an individual
is observed in the panel grows large. Since for the years 1993 to 2004, the average worker is
observed for 6 years, not all of the estimates of the time-invariant component, θi, identify a
consistent measure of a worker’s ability, which in turn may lead to measurement error in my
estimate of the average ability of workers in a layer of a firm. Although the panel is short, to
get a sense of how important is this issue, I conduct my analysis on workers that I observe for
at least 10 periods. Further, because I have established that the mechanism driving the sorting
pattern is heterogeneous across firms, in this section I only report results for skill stratification
and positive assortative matching. Tables A18 and A19 in the appendix present the regression
results for this restricted sample.
Table A18 reports tests for skill stratification. As in the previous table, higher ability agents
occupy the upper layers of organizations. In addition in column (5), even within two-layer firms
this relationship is now significant and indicates that an individual with a one hundred percent
increase in his ability will on average reside 0.254 layer higher.
27
Table 9: Testing Mechanism - Product Differentiation
Total Total
Number of layer Sample Number of layer Sample
Layers l-1 Size Low High Layers l Size Low High
TWO 1 2858 0.001 −0.061 TWO 2 599 −0.222 −0.148
(0.099) (0.066) (0.598) (0.206)
THREE 1 6409 −0.043 −0.018 THREE 2 2399 0.158 −0.042
(0.080) (0.044) (0.141) (0.089)
THREE 2 2399 −0.198 −0.060 THREE 3 1178 −0.022 −0.103
(0.148) (0.099) (0.184) (0.123)
FOUR 1 4490 −0.029 −0.123∗∗ FOUR 2 1917 −0.113 −0.018
(0.095) (0.080) (0.126) (0.072)
FOUR 2 1917 −0.198 −0.0009 FOUR 3 1041 −0.079 −0.102
(0.142) (0.091) (0.277) (0.132)
FOUR 3 1041 0.588∗ 0.224 FOUR 4 82
(0.335) (0.162)
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. Each cell displays the estimate of
a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers. The table only reports the value of the coefficient γ1 from equations with
the full set of controls. The left-hand side variable is the span of control of agents in layer l. In column (1) the right-hand side variable is the
estimated weighted average ability of workers in a lower layer, l − 1, interacted with industries degree of product differentiation. In column (2)
the right-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in layer l. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries.
Area fixed effects correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm
was present in the first year of the panel, 1976. Entries are omitted when sample sizes are too small.
Table A19 reports regression results that test for positive assortative matching. First, note the
results are similar to Table A19 and so there is strong evidence in favor of positive assortative
matching between workers in the different layers of firms. Second, in contrast to the results
reported in Table 4, there is now weak evidence indicating a positive correlation between workers’
ability in layers two and one in two-layer firms and layers three and one in four-layer firms. In
column (2), for example, a unit increase in the weighted average ability of workers in layer one
corresponds to a 0.137 increase in the average ability of workers in layer three. Hence, when I
remove inconsistent estimates of worker’s ability the general conclusions remain the same: the
evidence indicates that higher ability agents occupy the upper layers of firms and that there is
positive assortative matching between workers in the different layers of firms.
7.2 Estimation Error
A positive correlation between the individual fixed effects may be the outcome of using standard
econometric techniques. As discussed in Abowd et al. (2004) and Andrews et al. (2008), in
equation (9) there is a negative correlation between the worker and firm-layer effects caused
from standard estimation error. When the firm-layer fixed effects in equation (9) are on average
underestimated, the individual fixed effects will be overestimated, and when the firm-layer fixed
effects are on average overestimated, the individual fixed effects will be underestimated. Because
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in the panel workers transition between layers within firms, this implies that my regressions may
suffer from non-classical measurement error, biasing results.
To resolve these issues I conduct my analysis only on workers who have moved to a new
employer in the year 2009. For this sample of workers, any errors caused by miss-estimated firm-
layer fixed effects will be uncorrelated with one another. In these regressions, the coefficients will
only suffer from attenuation bias, however the sign of the estimated coefficients will more prop-
erly reflect the relationships of interest. Because the sample sizes are small in these regressions,
unlike in the previous sections, Tables A20 and A21 do not report results from all models.
For the year 2009, Table A20 reports how workers sort into layers. In all regressions the
coefficients of interest are positive, and indicate the higher ability workers occupy the upper
layers of firms. The findings are similar to Table 3. In two-layer firms, except when I examine
how workers sort into layers within firms, the coefficients are significant at the one percent level.
In addition in three and four-layer firms all the reported coefficients are significant at the one
percent level. For example, the findings indicate that within a three-layer firm an individual with
a unit increase in his ability will on average reside 0.411 layers higher. Therefore the conclusion
remains the same, higher ability agents sort into higher layers in firms.
Table A21 reports results of tests examining whether better workers are employed with bet-
ter workers in the other layers of firms. Because there are not many workers employed in the
same firm, Table A21 only reports results for three-layer and four-layer organizations. In firms
with three layers there is evidence of positive assortative matching. The majority of the reported
coefficients have a positive sign, and five coefficients are significant at the five percent level. For
example, across industries and locations a one unit increase in the average ability of agents in
layer two corresponds to a 0.368 increase in the average ability of workers in layer three. Because
the sample sizes are relatively small, as additional controls are included these relationships re-
mains positive but are no longer significant. In organizations with four layers, there is evidence
to suggest that there is a positive correlation between workers’ ability in the different layers of
firms. The majority of the reported coefficients have a positive sign, and six are significant at
the five percent level. For example, within industries and locations, a one unit increase in the
average ability of agents in layer one corresponds to a 0.291 average increase in the average abil-
ity of workers in layer two. Overall the findings are consistent with previous results and the
conclusion remains the same: there is evidence indicating that better workers are employed with
better workers in the other layers of firms.
7.3 Biased Estimates
Third, the estimated worker fixed effects may be biased. If workers in a given layer render their
subordinates more productive, and if their subordinates make them more productive, then this
should be reflected in wages. If this is the case, then for each individual the worker fixed effects
in equation (9) are not only identifying the ability of a worker, but also the average impact his
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co-workers have on his ability. Hence, this would imply that there is non-classical measurement
error in my estimates of workers’ ability, which may explain why there is a positive correlation
between the ability of workers in the different layers of firms.45
Biased estimates are a concern for tests that examine whether abler managers occupy the
upper layers of firms and tests of positive assortative matching between workers in the different
layers of firms.46 This issue was implicitly addressed in several parts of the paper. First, any
time-invariant complementarities between workers in the layers of firms are accounted for by
the firm-layer fixed effects. Second, the results the Section 5 also indicate even though there is a
another component to wages, equation (9) is a modest approximation to wages.47 Finally, because
it focuses on workers who move to a new firm, the analysis in Section 7.2 partially addresses this
concern. In this case, the worker fixed effects are uncorrelated with one another. The results in
Section 7.2 are consistent with the analysis in the paper: there is evidence that abler managers
occupy higher layers in firms and evidence in favor of positive assortative matching between
workers in the different layers of firms.
8 Conclusion
How workers sort together with other workers into layers and firms is crucial for understanding
the organization of firms. Without knowledge of the precise nature of the interactions between
workers in the different layers of firms it is difficult to comprehend how firms organize produc-
tion. Better knowledge of how workers sort into layers and firms is also important for under-
standing earnings’ inequality, how firms respond to changes in their market environment, and
how labor is allocated in the aggregate economy. Therefore identifying the mechanism that is
causing this sorting pattern is essential for understanding the nature of firms.
This paper directly examined how workers sort together in firms. My empirical strategy relies
on the idea that firms can be thought of as hierarchical teams, composed of layers that perform
different tasks. Using French administrative data, I classify employees into organizational layers
45In addition, if his co-workers have on a workers’ earning, this would imply that all my estimates in regressions
(12), (15) and (14) are an upper bound to the actual relationship of interest.
46Moreover if the model is an accurate description of the real world, since there is positive assortative matching
between workers in the different layers of firms, for a given layer, a peer effect should be positively correlated with
the ability of a worker. Therefore, according to the model the bias should be increasing in the ability of an individual.
For regressions (12), (15) and (14), this would further bias the coefficient of interests, α1 and γ1 in favor of finding a
positive result. Therefore, one interpretation of my results is that they present an upper bound to the relationships of
interest.
47Returning to the case of a worker employed in layer 1 in Firm 1 in period t who moves to layer 1 in Firm 2 in period
t+ 1. Let I(j, t) denote the set of workers in firm j in period t. Ignoring the returns to observables, and assuming a peer
effect, ψ(i, I(j, t)), his expected change in wages is equal to: E[wit+1 − wit|J(i, l, t + 1) = {1, 2} , J(i, l, t) = {1, 1}] =
ψ(1, I(2, t+ 1))−ψ(1, I(1, t))+φ1,2−φ1,1 + E[eit+1− eit|J(i, l, t+ 1) = {1, 2} , J(i, l, t) = {1, 1}]. Similarly, the expected
change in wages of a worker moving in the other direction is equal to: E[wit+1 − wit|J(i, l, t + 1) = {1, 1} , J(i, l, t) =
{1, 2}] = ψ(2, I(1, t + 1))− ψ(2, I(2, t)) + φ1,1 − φ1,2 + E[eit+1 − eit|J(i, l, t + 1) = {1, 1} , J(i, l, t) = {1, 2}]. Therefore
if the error term is strictly exogenous both expressions are simply equal to ψ(1, I(2, t + 1))− ψ(1, I(1, t)) + φ1,2 − φ1,1
and ψ(2, I(1, t + 1))− ψ(2, I(2, t)) + φ1,1 − φ1,2.
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as in Caliendo et al. (2014). I conclude that, within firms, higher ability workers are employed
in the higher layers of firms, and across firms, there is positive assortative matching between
workers in the different layers of firms. However I find only weak evidence for the mechanism,
as suggested by Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), to be causing this sorting pattern: higher
ability workers allow their managers to increase their span of control and employ larger teams.
Finally, I also find evidence that the opposite is taking place: higher ability workers limit man-
agers’ span of control.
An important question remains to be answered. The findings presented in this study indicate
that the nature of interactions between workers in the different layers of firms are many and
diverse, and firms are not organizing their production in a uniform way. Although there is
some evidence that higher ability workers allow their managers to increase their span of control
and employ larger teams, there is also evidence that the opposite is taking place. Some of the
organizational differences of firms can be explained by their degree of technological intensity
and the products they produce. An important question however still remains to be answered: If
better workers sort into firms with other better workers, what is causing this sorting pattern?
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Appendix A: Data Appendix
Description of Results
Table A1: Mean Log Wages by Transitions and Years
Two One One Two Change from
Origin-Destination Number of Years Year Year Years Two Years
Quartile Observations Before Before After After Before and After
1 to 1 25, 775 2.03 2.11 2.14 2.22 0.19
1 to 2 15, 654 1.89 1.99 2.19 2.24 0.35
1 to 3 11, 759 1.79 1.91 2.28 2.31 0.52
1 to 4 3, 410 1.85 1.97 2.64 2.58 0.73
2 to 1 16, 427 2.09 2.20 2.03 2.12 0.03
2 to 2 51, 732 2.07 2.14 2.16 2.21 0.14
2 to 3 44, 670 2.07 2.16 2.28 2.32 0.25
2 to 4 10, 489 2.08 2.19 2.55 2.55 0.47
3 to 1 11, 468 2.25 2.37 1.98 2.11 −0.14
3 to 2 40, 717 2.17 2.25 2.14 2.21 0.04
3 to 3 109, 545 2.29 2.35 2.38 2.41 0.12
3 to 4 42, 056 2.42 2.50 2.66 2.69 0.27
4 to 1 3, 445 2.65 2.79 2.05 2.24 −0.41
4 to 2 8, 550 2.42 2.56 2.16 2.25 −0.17
4 to 3 30, 478 2.51 2.60 2.46 2.50 −0.01
4 to 4 72, 529 2.73 2.81 2.85 2.87 0.14
Notes: Descriptive statistics of job transitions from the estimation of equation (9).
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Figure 2: Wages of Movers
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The Panel Dataset of the DADS
To estimate worker and firm fixed effects, I use the years 1993 to 2004 from the panel dataset
of the DADS. Initially, the dataset contains 24,882,933 total observations, 5,469,362 workers and
1,614,337 firms. I remove from the dataset any workers or firms that cannot be properly identified
or that have missing values. For reasons of computational tractability, I restrict the sample to all
workers who are born in an even numbered year, are between the ages 18 and 65 and work in
continental France. I also eliminate from the sample all individuals I observe only once in the
panel and who are not full-time workers. In a given year, an individual may hold multiple jobs.
In case of multiple jobs, for a given year I keep the worker’s employment with the highest salary.
Finally, I also eliminate all firms in the agricultural and fishing industries. From this sample of
workers and firms, to obtain an exact estimate of worker and firm-layer fixed effects I find the
largest connected group. The largest connected group contains 4,999,728 observations, 753,092
workers, 399,676 firms and 569,198 firm-layer pairs.
For the years 1993 to 2004 Table A2 presents distribution of the number of years workers are
observed in the panel dataset of the DADS.
Table A2: Distribution of the number of years workers are observed in the panel
variable mean min p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max
Years 6.63 2 2 2 2 4 6 10 11 11 12 12
For the years 1993 to 2004 Table A3 presents distribution of the number of years firms are
observed in the panel dataset of the DADS as well as the distribution of the number of workers
that are observed in a layer in a given year.
Table A3: Distribution of the number of years layers within firms are observed in the panel and
the distribution of workers per layer in a firm
variable mean min p1 p5 p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 p95 p99 max
Years 3.28 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 8 10 11 12
Workers 2.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 4 7 22 9,674
The Exhaustive Cross-Section of the DADS
The exhaustive cross-section of the DADS contains information on all workers who earn a
positive wage in a french establishment. For a given year, the observations are at the worker-
establishment level. To clean the data, I first remove any observations that do not have a positive
amount of hours, days, or wages reported or that do not have an occupation. I also remove
any observations in which the firm and individual identifiers are missing and firms employing
workers with occupational codes different from 2 to 6.
For every establishment there is information on its location (341 employment areas), the
industry it operates in and the parent firm. I aggregate the data to the level of the firm, and
retain only firms where all establishments operate in the same industry. Within a firm, a worker
can have multiple jobs if he is employed in two different establishments. In this case, I treat the
worker as two separate observations.
To identify the layers in a firm, I use the first digit of the CS occupational codes which
range from 2 to 6. Therefore in total I can identify up to four layers. Layer 1 corresponds
to qualified and non-qualified administrative workers and blue-collar workers. It contains all
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workers with CS occupational codes 5 and 6, respectively. I group CS occupational codes 5 and 6
together because their distribution of ability are similar. Layer 2 is composed of supervisors and
individuals with higher level of responsibility than ordinary workers, and contains all workers
with an occupational code 4. Layer 3 is composed of senior directors and top management staff
and contains all workers with an occupational code 3. Layer 4 corresponds to owners who receive
a wage and CEOs. It contains all workers with a CS occupational code 2. Further I consider a
firm as having a layer if at least one employee is present in that layer and classify firms by the
total number of layers in their organization. For example, a firm where layers 1, 3 and 4 are
present and a firm where layers 1, 2 and 4 are present are both considered three-layer firms.
Merged Datasets
For the year 2004 I merge the information from the panel and exhaustive cross-section datasets
together. Unlike the exhaustive cross-section, since the panel data is based on a 5 percent sample
of the French population, it contains information on a sample of all firms operating in mainland
France. Approximately 1 percent of firms in the panel dataset are not matched. I keep only
firms that operate in the non-service sectors, and remove any firms that operate in more than
one industry and location. In total the matched dataset contains 23, 916 firms that operate in
17 industries, of which 2,160 are one-layer firms, 3,322 are two-layer firms, 7,860 are three-layer
firms and 5,450 are four-layer firms. Table A4 reports number of firms and workers observed in
the matched sample by industry.
Table A4: Number of Firms by Industry
Industry Number of Firms Number of Workers
Agricultural & Food 3,363 7,217
Apparel & Leather 657 1,533
Publishing & Printing 1,351 2,618
Pharmaceuticals & Perfumes 226 722
Domestic Appliances & Furniture 1,063 2,417
Automobiles 373 1,700
Ships, Aircraft, Railroad Equipment 235 748
Machinery 3,070 6,138
Electric and Electronic Equipment 852 1,651
Building Materials & Glass Products 733 1,394
Textiles 650 1,594
Wood & Paper 1,162 2,643
Chemicals, Rubber & Plastics 1,382 3,728
Basic Metals & Metal Products 3,014 6,752
Electric & Electronic Components 564 1,568
Combustibles 23 95
Water, Gas & Electricity 72 181
Tables A5 and A6 contains descriptive statistics of firms in the exhaustive cross-section dataset
and the matched dataset for the year 2004, respectively. As is evident from the average and the
median number of workers and the average and the median number of hours in a firm, the
matched dataset contains larger firms.48 For both measures of firm size, number of employees
48As explained further below, one reason for this result is that I obtain my measures of workers’ ability from the
37
Table A5: Descriptive Statistics from the Exhaustive Cross-Section Dataset
Exhaustive Cross-Section:
Total Average Median Standard Deviation
Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number
of of of of of of of of
Layers Firms Employees Hours Employees Hours Employees Hours
1 160, 904 3.45 3, 382.28 2 2, 028 4.73 4, 980.97
2 74, 676 8.36 9, 437.35 5 6, 084 10.80 11, 971.35
3 52, 949 23.90 31, 701.27 11 13, 342 53.59 80, 918.29
4 14, 434 59.92 82, 872.88 33 47, 106 96.12 119, 415.10
Notes: Descriptive statistics from the exhaustive cross-section of the DADS for the year 2004.
Table A6: Descriptive Statistics from the Matched Dataset
Matched Sample:
Total Average Median Standard Deviation
Number Number Number Number Number Number Number Number
of of of of of of of of
Layers Firms Employees Hours Employees Hours Employees Hours
1 2, 160 11.00 11, 844.12 8 8, 233.50 23.14 25, 319.03
2 3, 322 19.88 25, 989.84 14 18, 173.50 22.11 28, 176.84
3 7, 860 67.14 101, 683.20 37 53, 741 115.92 183, 040.00
4 5, 450 83.61 128, 090.50 53 81, 350 99.54 155, 456.00
Notes: Descriptive statistics from the the matched sample dataset for the year 2004.
and the number of hours, the standard deviation in the matched sample is also greater than in
the population. The sample is therefore biased towards larger firms, and is not representative of
the entire population of firms. To the extent that the theory applies to all firms the unrepresen-
tativeness of the sample is not of concern.
Technological Intensity
To group industries by their degree of technological intensity, I use the first four digits of the
French classification of industries, NAF Rev 1, which corresponds to ISIC Rev 3.1. I then apply
the same grouping as in the OECD (2003) classification. The table below, reproduced from Annex
1 of the OECD (2003), presents the list of industries by their degree of technological intensity.
Table A7: Technological Intensity
Low Medium-Low Medium-High High
Industries 36 to 37 351 31 353
Industries 20 to 22 25 34 2453
Industries 15 to 16 23 24 exl. 2453 30
Industries 17 to 19 26 352 & 359 32
Industries 27 to 28 29 33
Notes: List of industries by their degree of technological intensity. Reproduced from the OECD (2003).
largest connected set of workers and firms.
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Product Differentiation
To group industries by their degree of production differentiation, I first assign each product
in the Rauch (1999) classification to at least one ISIC Rev 3.1 industry using ISIC Rev 2 as a cross-
walk. Second, using the conservative definition of products, I assign a value of 1 to homogeneous
goods, 2 to reference priced goods and 3 to differentiated products. Third, for each industry I
then calculate the average degree of differentiation of goods mapped into an industry giving
equal weight to each product. And fourth I define industries with a low degree of product
differentiation as the industries where the average degree of differentiation is less than 2.5, and
industries with a high degree of production differentiation as the industries where the average
degree of differentiation is greater than or equal to 2.5. The table below presents the list of
industries by their degree of product differentiation.
Table A8: Product Differentiation
Low High
Industries 1 to 2 10
Industries 5 14
Industries 11 to 13 18 to 20
Industries 15 to 17 22
Industries 21 25 to 26
Industries 23 to 24 28 to 36
Industries 27 72
Industries 37
Industries 40
Industries 52
Notes: List of industries by their degree of product differentiation.
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Appendix B: Test for Positive Assortative Matching
In this section I test whether there is positive assortative matching between workers and their
co-workers in a firm. I adopt the empirical test proposed by de Melo (2013) who shows that
even though wages are not monotone with respect to firm productivity, wages will be monotone
with respect to workers’ skills. Therefore, if better workers are sorting together into firms, the
correlation between a worker’s fixed effect and the average fixed effect of his co-workers should
be positive.
To examine whether this prediction holds in the data, I conduct two tests. For the year 2004,
I first correlate the worker fixed effect with the average fixed effect of his co-workers across all
firms in the economy, across firms with the same organization, and across the different layers of
firms. And second, for the 2009 I conduct the same tests on the sample of workers who have
moved to a new firm.
Tables A9 and A10 presents the results. The first column of table A9 presents the sample size
and the second column contains the correlation across all workers in the economy and across
firms with the same number of layers. The third column and fourth columns contain the same
estimates for the year 2009. In all cases, the correlations reported are positive. For example across
all firms in the economy, the correlation between the worker fixed effect and the average fixed
effect of his co-workers is 0.352. Table A10, has a similar structure as Table A10 and goes further
and estimates the correlation within the different layers of firms. The conclusions are similar:
all reported correlations are positive, and so there is evidence of positive assortative matching
between workers in firms.
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Table A9: Correlations Across Firms
Total
Number of Year 2004 Year 2009
Layers N corr(θi; θ−i) N corr(θ; ψ)
All 31, 941 0.352 8, 302 0.221
ONE 481 0.374 144 0.153
TWO 1, 871 0.382 395 0.168
THREE 15, 773 0.362 4, 538 0.227
FOUR 13, 816 0.335 3, 225 0.219
Notes: Correlations between the ability of workers and their co-workers across firms with the same number of layers.
Table A10: Correlations within Layers of Firms
Total
Number of Year 2004 Year 2009
Layers layer N corr(θi; θ−i) N corr(θi; θ−i)
ONE 1 481 0.374 144 0.153
TWO 1 1, 819 0.361 332 0.182
TWO 2 52 0.639 23 0.403
THREE 1 15, 026 0.355 2, 681 0.191
THREE 2 648 0.310 535 0.348
THREE 3 99 0.539 342 0.198
FOUR 1 13, 127 0.325 1, 829 0.184
FOUR 2 550 0.300 435 0.314
FOUR 3 139 0.429 238 0.090
FOUR 4 − − − −
Notes: Correlations between the ability of workers and their co-workers within the layers of firms.
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Appendix C: Testing the Mechanism - Managers’ Ability
In this section, I examine whether agents’ span of control increases with ability. I estimate the
following equation:
ln spanlj = γ0 + γ1ability
l
j + Xjβ+ uj, (15)
where abilityl j is the estimated weighted average ability of all workers in firm j who are in layer
l, and spanlj is defined above. The controls Xj are firm age, whether the firm was present in
1976, and indicator variables for industry and location. I estimate equation (15) for firms with
the same number of layers and for different values of l, separately. In equation (15) the interest
is in how the span of control of agents in layer l varies with their ability. If there is positive
assortative matching between workers in the different layers of firms, and abler subordinates
render their superiors more productive by allowing them to supervise more workers, then γ1
should be positive and significant.
Table A11 reports regression results. The table has a similar structure to Table 4. Each entry
in the table reports an estimated value of the coefficient γ1. The first column reports the total
number of layers in firms. The second column reports the layer for which weighted average
ability is the right-hand-side variable in equation (15), the third column reports the sample size
of the regressions, and the fourth to ninth columns report estimated values of γ1.49 In Table A11
all the standard errors are bootstrapped and based on 500 replications.
Column (1) contains no controls and examines how workers’ ability varies with their span
of control across industries and locations. The results indicate that workers’ span of control is
decreasing with their ability. For example in three-layer firms a one unit increase in the average
ability of workers in layer two is on average associated with a 17.5 percent decrease in their span
of control.
Within industries and locations, the relationship remains negative but not significant. Column
(2) examines how workers’ span of control varies with their ability within industries, while
column (3) examines the relationship within locations. In both models the evidence suggests that
there may be a negative relationship between agents’ ability and their span of control, however
this is not conclusive. Column (4) examines the relationship within industries and locations. The
results remain the same: although the coefficients are negative, they are not significant.
Column (5) reports results with firm observables as controls. In column (5) two coefficients
are negative and significant at the five percent level. In organizations with three layers, a one
unit increase in the average ability of workers in layer three is associated with a 27.3 decrease in
their span of control, while a one unit increase in the average ability of workers in layer two is
associated with a 15.8 decrease in their span of control. Finally column (6) reports results with
the full set of controls, industry, location and firm observables. The coefficients remain negative
but not significant.
In Table A11 nearly all of the estimates are negative, however only a handful of them are
significant. The only consistent exception is the regressions for agents in layer four in four-layer
firms, reported in the last row of the table. In this case the coefficients alternate sign, however
49Note that the reported sample sizes in Table A11 vary across regressions. For example, in regressions with four-
layer firms the sample size can be as small 80 observations or as large as 1,918 observations. The sample size also
increases in regressions examining the mechanism in the lower layers of firms. As explained previously, this is not
surprising given nature of the dataset and, because firms are hierarchies in the dataset there are less employees in the
higher layers of firms. Also the reported sample sizes are different from Table 4, since to estimate equation (15) only
the ability of one employee in a layer has to be recorded in the dataset.
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Table A11: Testing Mechanism - Managers’ Ability
Total
Number of layer Sample
Layers l Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TWO 2 601 −0.243 −0.161 −0.213 −0.109 −0.249 −0.115
(0.161) (0.132) (0.221) (0.196) (0.161) (0.192)
THREE 2 2413 −0.175∗∗ −0.083 −0.081 −0.037 −0.158∗∗ −0.027
(0.075) (0.069) (0.082) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
THREE 3 1183 −0.232∗∗ −0.117 −0.067 −0.041 −0.273∗∗ −0.068
(0.114) (0.101) (0.125) (0.118) (0.111) (0.117)
FOUR 2 1918 −0.120∗ −0.068 −0.062 −0.055 −0.117∗ −0.056
(0.064) (0.060) (0.068) (0.062) (0.063) (0.062)
FOUR 3 1042 −0.139 0.001 −0.216 −0.109 −0.116 −0.092
(0.126) (0.107) (0.133) (0.118) (0.123) (0.118)
FOUR 4 82 0.090 −0.001 0.313 −0.074
(0.299) (0.369) (0.517) (0.301)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Area FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Firm Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regressions for equation
(15). Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers. The table only reports the value of
the coefficient γ1 from equation (15). The left-hand side variable is the span of control of agents in layer l. The right-hand side variable is the
estimated weighted average ability of workers in layer l. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the
341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the first year of the
panel, 1976. Entries are omitted when sample sizes are too small.
they are never significant, and so they do not lead to a firm conclusion.
To summarize the results reported in Table A11, out of the 34 estimated coefficients, 4 are
negative and significant at the five percent level, 2 are negative and significant at the ten percent
level, 24 are negative but not significant, and 3 are positive but not significant. In light of these
findings, the evidence suggests that although there is positive assortative matching between
workers in the different layers of firms, the model’s mechanism explaining this sorting pattern
is not present in the data. Indeed, the findings suggest that the opposite may be taking place.
Abler managers form teams with abler production workers, however these workers take up more
of the managers’ time.
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Appendix D: Mono-Establishment Firms
Table A12: Mono-Establishment Firms: Regression Results for Skill Stratification
Total
Number Sample
of Layers Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TWO 4, 233 0.054∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗ 0.043
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015) (0.134)
THREE 18, 714 0.370∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.411∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019)
FOUR 14, 591 0.460∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No
Area FE No No Yes Yes No
Firm FE No No No No Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regression results of equation
(10) for workers in mono-establishment firms. Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of
layers. The table only reports the value of the coefficient µ1 from equation (10). The left-hand side variable is the layer that a worker occupies. The
right-hand side variable is the ability of the worker. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the 341
employment areas in mainland France.
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Table A13: Mono-Establishment Firms: Regression Results for Sorting Tests
Total
Number of layer layer Sample
Layers l l-g Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TWO 2 1 139 0.098 0.110 −0.027 0.092 0.105 0.081
(0.098) (0.101) (0.152) (0.199) (0.097) (0.288)
THREE 3 2 423 0.243∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗
(0.071) (0.077) (0.084) (0.090) (0.071) (0.091)
THREE 3 1 613 0.301∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.070) (0.078) (0.086) (0.067) (0.084)
THREE 2 1 1306 0.241∗∗∗ 0.225∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.242∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.035) (0.091)
FOUR 4 3 15 0.636∗ 0.691
(0.370) (0.479)
FOUR 4 2 22 −0.181 −0.118
(0.290) (0.282)
FOUR 4 1 37 0.333 0.363 0.559 0.417
(0.300) (0.256) (1.189) (0.322)
FOUR 3 2 404 0.207∗∗∗ 0.195∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.177 0.207∗∗∗ 0.176
(0.069) (0.077) (0.091) (0.114) (0.069) (0.115)
FOUR 3 1 621 0.101∗ 0.094 0.130∗ 0.127 0.099∗ 0.126
(0.058) (0.060) (0.077) (0.082) (0.058) (0.082)
FOUR 2 1 1141 0.345∗∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.049) (0.060) (0.062) (0.048) (0.063)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Area FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Firm Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) in parentheses. OLS regressions for equation (12)
for mono-establishment firms. Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers and across
two layers of firms. The table only reports the value of the coefficient α1 from equation (12). The left-hand side variable is the estimated weighted
average ability of workers in layer l. The right-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in a lower layer, l − g.
Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm
controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the first year of the panel, 1976. Entries are omitted because the sample
size was too small.
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Appendix D: Technological Intensity
Table A14: Technological Intensity: Regression Results for Skill Stratification
Total
Number Sample
of Layers Size Low Medium-Low Medium-High High
TWO 4, 140 0.022 0.065∗∗∗ 0.053 −0.003
(0.018) (0.064) (0.048) (0.088)
THREE 18, 114 0.257∗∗∗ 0.312∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.028) (0.034) (0.069)
FOUR 14, 633 0.392∗∗∗ 0.376∗∗∗ 0.496∗∗∗ 0.612∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.035) (0.035) (0.077)
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regression results of equation
(10) with industry and location controls. The table only reports the value of the coefficient µ1 from equation (10). The left-hand side variable is
the layer that a worker occupies. The right-hand side variable is the ability of the worker interacted with the degree of technological intensity of
the industry he is employed in. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the 341 employment areas
in mainland France. Firm controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the first year of the panel, 1976. Entries are
omitted because the sample size was too small.
Table A15: Technological Intensity: Regression Results for Sorting Tests
Total
Number of layer layer Sample
Layers l l-g Size Low Medium-Low Medium-High High
THREE 3 2 419 0.325∗∗ 0.217 0.050 0.249
(0.133) (0.263) (0.153) (0.220)
THREE 3 1 602 0.371∗∗ 0.086 0.392∗∗ 0.584∗∗
(0.145) (0.154) (0.165) (0.258)
THREE 2 1 1247 0.357∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.180∗ 0.219∗∗
(0.070) (0.068) (0.095) (0.106)
FOUR 3 2 417 0.014 0.657∗∗ 0.378∗∗ −0.032
(0.119) (0.281) (0.175) (0.202)
FOUR 3 1 617 0.197∗∗ 0.354∗∗ 0.145 0.008
(0.094) (0.179) (0.158) (0.263)
FOUR 2 1 1131 0.297∗∗∗ 0.445∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗ 0.290∗∗
(0.093) (0.152) (0.093) (0.138)
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) in parentheses. OLS regressions for equation (12)
with industry and location controls. Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers and
across two layers of firms. The table only reports the value of the coefficient α1 from equation (12). The left-hand side variable is the estimated
weighted average ability of workers in layer l. The right-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in a lower layer,
l − g interacted with the industry’s degree of technological intensity. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects
correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the
first year of the panel, 1976. Entries are omitted because the sample size was too small.
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Appendix D: Product Differentiation
Table A16: Product Differentiation: Regression Results for Skill Stratification
Total
Number Sample
of Layers Size Low High
TWO 4, 414 −0.002 0.057∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017)
THREE 19, 751 0.270∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.017)
FOUR 15, 989 0.387∗∗∗ 0.444∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.019)
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regression results of equation
(10) with industry and location controls. The left-hand side variable is the layer that a worker occupies. The right-hand side variable is the ability
of the worker interacted with the degree of product differentiation of the industry he is employed in. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17
industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm controls include the age of the firm, and whether
the firm was present in the first year of the panel, 1976. Entries are omitted because the sample size was too small.
Table A17: Product Differentiation: Regression Results for Sorting Tests
Total
Number of layer layer Sample
Layers l l-g Size Low High
THREE 3 2 452 0.187 0.277∗∗
(0.129) (0.109)
THREE 2 1 1374 0.207∗∗∗ 0.248∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.048)
FOUR 3 2 451 0.106 0.206
(0.132) (0.140)
FOUR 3 1 686 0.131 0.117
(0.101) (0.078)
FOUR 2 1 1248 0.132∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.068)
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 iterations) in parentheses. OLS regressions for equation (12)
with industry and location controls. Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers and
across two layers of firms. The table only reports the value of the coefficient α1 from equation (12). The left-hand side variable is the estimated
weighted average ability of workers in layer l. The right-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in a lower layer,
l − g interacted with the industry’s degree of product differentiation. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects
correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the
first year of the panel, 1976. Entries are omitted because the sample size was too small.
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Appendix E: Robustness Checks Inconsistent Estimates
Table A18: Regression Results for Skill Stratification
Total
Number Sample
of Layers Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TWO 1, 746 0.118∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.254∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) (0.098)
THREE 10, 374 0.634∗∗∗ 0.604∗∗∗ 0.611∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.033)
FOUR 8, 601 0.706∗∗∗ 0.685∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.677∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗∗
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.036)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No
Area FE No No Yes Yes No
Firm FE No No No No Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regression results of equation
(10) for workers with at least 10 years in the dataset. Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number
of layers. The table only reports the value of the coefficient µ1 from equation (10). The left-hand side variable is the layer that a worker occupies.
The right-hand side variable is the ability of the worker. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the
341 employment areas in mainland France.
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Table A19: Regression Results for Sorting Tests
Total
Number of layer layer
Layers l l-g Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
TWO 2 1 38 0.354∗∗ 0.326 0.127 0.348∗∗
(0.143) (0.206) (1.473) (0.139)
THREE 3 2 232 0.455∗∗∗ 0.449∗∗∗ 0.502∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗∗ 0.460∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.070) (0.125) (0.139) (0.075) (0.142)
THREE 3 1 380 0.421∗∗∗ 0.429∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗ 0.277∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗
(0.092) (0.092) (0.123) (0.133) (0.092) (0.135)
THREE 2 1 747 0.382∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.049) (0.059) (0.061) (0.049) (0.062)
FOUR 4 3 9 0.674 0.881
(0.551) (1.000)
FOUR 4 2 14 0.112 0.111
(0.204) (0.246)
FOUR 4 1 19 0.243 0.567 0.522 0.260
(0.591) (1.089) (2.524) (0.645)
FOUR 3 2 225 0.348∗∗∗ 0.358∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.391∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.369∗
(0.092) (0.105) (0.140) (0.173) (0.093) (0.192)
FOUR 3 1 379 0.138∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 0.114 0.117 0.135∗∗ 0.127
(0.070) (0.071) (0.109) (0.124) (0.072) (0.129)
FOUR 2 1 679 0.357∗∗∗ 0.361∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗
(0.081) (0.083) (0.124) (0.131) (0.080) (0.132)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Area FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Firm Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regression results of equation
(12) for workers with at least 10 years. Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total number of layers and
across two layers of firms. The table only reports the value of the coefficient α1 from equation (12). The left-hand side variable is the estimated
weighted average ability of workers in layer l. The right-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in a lower layer,
l − g. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Firm
controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the first year of the panel, 1976. Entries are omitted because the sample
size was too small.
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Appendix E: Robustness Checks Estimation Error
Table A20: Regression Results for Skill Stratification
Total
Number Sample
of Layers Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
TWO 1, 860 0.084∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗ 0.084
(0.024) (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) (0.076)
THREE 7, 374 0.528∗∗∗ 0.487∗∗∗ 0.489∗∗∗ 0.464∗∗∗ 0.490∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.040)
FOUR 4, 659 0.639∗∗∗ 0.602∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.585∗∗∗ 0.605∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.052)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No
Area FE No No Yes Yes No
Firm FE No No No No Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regression results of equation
(10) for workers who have moved to a new firm in the year 2009. Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same
total number of layers. The table only reports the value of the coefficient µ1 from equation (10). The left-hand side variable is the layer that a
worker occupies. The right-hand side variable is the ability of the worker. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects
correspond to the 341 employment areas in mainland France. Entries are omitted because the sample size was too small.
50
Table A21: Regression Results for Sorting Tests
Total
Number of layer layer Sample
Layers l l-g Size (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
THREE 3 2 183 0.368∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗ 0.193 0.072 0.407∗∗∗ 0.078
(0.083) (0.087) (0.135) (0.121) (0.086) (0.147)
THREE 3 1 320 0.078 0.093 0.164 0.095 0.075 0.107
(0.059) (0.060) (0.111) (0.116) (0.060) (0.123)
THREE 2 1 439 0.127∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.072 0.099 0.089∗ 0.038
(0.051) (0.051) (0.072) (0.074) (0.050) (0.074)
FOUR 3 2 139 0.271∗∗ 0.212∗ 0.261 0.215 0.221∗∗ 0.165
(0.110) (0.113) (0.166) (0.260) (0.114) (0.243)
FOUR 3 1 237 0.100 0.094 0.080 0.121 0.083 0.072
(0.066) (0.071) (0.101) (0.114) (0.064) (0.127)
FOUR 2 1 318 0.304∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.234∗∗ 0.222∗ 0.291∗∗∗ 0.205
(0.062) (0.065) (0.118) (0.134) (0.061) (0.136)
Industry FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Area FE No No Yes Yes No Yes
Firm Controls No No No No Yes Yes
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications) in parentheses. OLS regression results of equation
(12) for workers who have moved to a new firm in 2009. Each cell displays the estimate of a separate regression for firms with the same total
number of layers and across two layers of firms. The table only reports the value of the coefficient α1 from equation (12). The left-hand side
variable is the estimated weighted average ability of workers in layer l. The right-hand side variable is the estimated weighted average ability of
workers in a lower layer, l − g. Industry fixed effects correspond to the 17 industries. Area fixed effects correspond to the 341 employment areas
in mainland France. Firm controls include the age of the firm, and whether the firm was present in the first year of the panel, 1976. Entries are
omitted because the sample size was too small.
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